By Eneojo Herbert Idakwo
A Rejoinder to “The Constitutional Coup That Must Not Stand” by Hassan Husaini mni
Introduction: Reform Is Not a Coup
Few issues have generated as much passionate debate in Nigeria’s political history as the question of restructuring. Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, successive administrations, constitutional conferences, elder statesmen, civil society organisations, traditional institutions and political leaders have all acknowledged that Nigeria’s governance structure requires substantial reform. The disagreement has never been about whether the federation has structural defects. Rather, it has centred on the nature and scope of the reforms needed to address those defects.
Against this backdrop, the article titled “The Constitutional Coup That Must Not Stand” portrays proposals for regional government and constitutional restructuring as an existential threat to Nigeria’s democracy. It argues that initiatives such as the proposed Geo-Political Zones Bill, state police and fiscal decentralisation amount to a deliberate attempt to dismantle the Constitution through executive fiat.
Such concerns deserve serious engagement because constitutional democracy depends on vigilance against abuse of power. Yet the article arrives at conclusions that are not supported either by Nigeria’s constitutional history or by the practical realities of federal governance around the world. In several instances, it confuses proposals for constitutional amendment with unconstitutional actions. It also treats every discussion about restructuring as evidence of authoritarian ambition, when in reality constitutional reform is itself one of the legitimate instruments provided by the Constitution for national development.
The fundamental weakness of the argument lies in its assumption that preserving the current constitutional arrangement is synonymous with protecting democracy. That assumption overlooks one undeniable fact. Nigeria’s present governance structure has produced decades of economic stagnation, over-centralisation of political authority, fiscal dependence, institutional inefficiency and growing insecurity. Defending a system simply because it currently exists does not make that system effective.
The question before Nigerians is therefore much deeper than whether certain constitutional provisions currently exist. The real question is whether the existing structure continues to serve the interests of the Nigerian people.
Nigeria Is Federal in Name but Unitary in Practice
Nigeria officially describes itself as a federation. However, many constitutional scholars have observed that the country operates a system that resembles a unitary state more than a genuine federation.
In classical federal systems, power is shared between the central government and the constituent units in a manner that allows each level of government to exercise meaningful constitutional authority. States or regions possess significant legislative, fiscal and administrative independence. They raise substantial revenues, manage local resources, maintain certain security institutions and design policies that reflect their unique economic and social circumstances.
Nigeria presents a different picture.
The Exclusive Legislative List places an extraordinary concentration of powers in the hands of the Federal Government. Matters ranging from policing and railways to mineral resources, electricity transmission, customs, ports, aviation, labour regulation, currency, immigration and major taxation remain almost entirely under federal control.
Consequently, state governments function with limited constitutional authority despite being closer to the people they govern.
This excessive concentration of power has created a governance culture in which virtually every major developmental initiative depends upon Abuja.
State governors travel monthly to receive allocations from the Federation Account.
Local governments rely almost entirely on federal transfers.
Economic planning revolves around federal approvals.
Even projects that affect only local communities often require decisions from the centre.
This arrangement contradicts one of the central objectives of federalism, which is to bring government closer to the people while encouraging initiative and competition among constituent units.
Ironically, many of these centralised features were inherited not from Nigeria’s founding fathers but from successive military governments that ruled between 1966 and 1999.
Military administrations naturally favour command structures.
Civilian federations favour decentralisation.
Nigeria has retained too much of the military command system while expecting democratic outcomes.
The First Republic Demonstrated the Strength of Regional Government
One of the greatest misconceptions surrounding restructuring is the belief that regional government represents an entirely new experiment.
It does not.
Nigeria has already experienced regional federalism.
Indeed, many historians regard the period between 1954 and 1966 as one of the country’s most productive eras.
The Northern, Western and Eastern Regions possessed substantial constitutional autonomy under the federal arrangement established before military intervention.
Each region controlled significant aspects of its economic development.
Each developed according to its comparative advantages.
Each competed with the others not through political confrontation but through economic performance.
The Western Region became internationally recognised for its remarkable investment in education under Chief Obafemi Awolowo. It introduced free primary education, established Africa’s first television station, constructed the iconic Cocoa House in Ibadan and invested heavily in agricultural development funded largely through cocoa revenues.
The Eastern Region emerged as one of Africa’s fastest-growing industrial centres under Dr. Michael Okpara. Manufacturing expanded rapidly. Palm produce generated substantial export earnings. Agricultural settlements flourished, while investments in healthcare, education and industrial estates transformed the regional economy.
The Northern Region similarly pursued aggressive agricultural development under the leadership of Sir Ahmadu Bello. Groundnut pyramids became global symbols of agricultural productivity. Cotton, hides, livestock and other agricultural commodities generated enormous wealth that financed schools, roads and public institutions throughout the region.
None of these achievements depended upon monthly allocations from Lagos, which then served as the federal capital.
The regions generated wealth.
They invested locally.
They competed positively.
That healthy competition accelerated national development.
Perhaps the most important lesson from that era is that regional governments focused less on sharing national revenue and more on creating new wealth.
That culture of productivity gradually disappeared following decades of military centralisation.
The discovery and growing dependence on petroleum revenues further reinforced this shift by making federal allocation, rather than productive enterprise, the primary source of public finance.
The consequences remain visible today.
Instead of competing in agriculture, manufacturing, technology and industrialisation, many states now compete only for larger shares of federally collected revenue.
Such dependency was never the vision of Nigeria’s founding federal structure.
Rather than viewing regional government as a dangerous innovation, Nigerians should recognise it as a return to constitutional principles that once produced remarkable developmental outcomes.
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