By Ibrahim Bunu
Lessons from the Late Isa Funtua, MKO Abiola, Bashir Tofa, Alex Ekwueme and the Nigerian Political Experience.
THE QUESTION EVERY POLITICIAN SHOULD ASK
There is a dangerous misunderstanding about politics in Nigeria — and indeed in every plural society.
Many politicians understand representation, but do not understand coalition.
Many understand grievance, but do not understand negotiation.
Many understand identity, but do not understand interest.
Many know how to mobilise their own people, but do not know how to persuade people who are not their own.
And many believe that because their people have suffered exclusion, because their region has been disadvantaged, or because they believe it is “their turn,” political power should automatically be handed to them.
That is not how power works.
Politics is not a queue at a government office where you present your identity card and collect your turn.
Politics is the organised competition for power, influence, resources, legitimacy and policy outcomes.
And in a complex federation like Nigeria, political power is rarely won by one ethnic group acting alone.
It is won through alliances, negotiations, relationships, compromises, strategic concessions, trust-building, party structures, electoral arithmetic and the ability to make other political blocs believe that your victory will not become their defeat.
This is why the late Ismaila Isa Funtua’s 2020 Arise TV interview deserves to be revisited — not as an excuse for ethnic stereotyping, but as a political lesson.
Funtua argued that if the Igbo wanted the Nigerian presidency, they needed to participate more deeply in national political coalitions and “belong.” He used MKO Abiola’s ability to defeat Bashir Tofa in Kano during the 1993 presidential election as an illustration of what he considered inclusive politics. (TheCable)
Whether one agrees with Funtua or not, there is a serious political principle underneath the controversy:
You cannot build national power exclusively through a regional political strategy.
That principle deserves a much deeper examination.
PART ONE
POLITICS IS NOT “GIVE US OUR TURN”
The first lesson is uncomfortable:
Nobody owes a politician the presidency simply because his ethnic group believes it deserves the presidency.
There is a distinction between:
justice and entitlement;
equity and automatic allocation;
political aspiration and political entitlement.
A region can legitimately argue:
“We have not produced a president for a long time.”
That is a political argument.
It can say:
“For national balance, it is desirable that the presidency move to our region.”
That is another legitimate political argument.
It can say:
“Our exclusion is damaging national cohesion.”
That deserves serious consideration.
But there is another proposition:
“It is our turn, therefore everyone must support our candidate.”
That is no longer merely a moral argument.
It is a political demand.
And political demands must be negotiated.
That is the distinction many political actors fail to understand.
POLITICS IS THE ART OF CONVERTING DEMANDS INTO AGREEMENTS
Suppose five political blocs are sitting around a table.
Bloc A wants the presidency.
Bloc B wants the vice presidency.
Bloc C wants Senate leadership.
Bloc D wants infrastructure commitments.
Bloc E wants security guarantees and ministerial representation.
Nobody possesses everything.
Therefore, everyone negotiates.
Bloc A says:
“Support my presidential candidate.”
Bloc B replies:
“What do we receive in return?”
Bloc C asks:
“What happens to our region?”
Bloc D asks:
“What is your economic programme?”
Bloc E asks:
“Will your government respect our interests?”
This is politics.
Not sentiment.
Not anger.
Not Facebook outrage.
Not ethnic speeches.
Not hashtags.
Negotiation.
The strongest political actors understand this.
They don’t simply ask:
“What do we deserve?”
They also ask:
“What can we offer?”
That second question is often more important.
PART TWO
THE ABiola–TOFA LESSON
This is where Funtua’s example becomes particularly interesting.
In the 1993 presidential election, MKO Abiola of the Social Democratic Party defeated Bashir Tofa of the National Republican Convention in Kano, Tofa’s home state. Contemporary accounts of Funtua’s argument emphasised that Abiola’s broad personal relationships and political outreach helped him compete beyond his regional base. (TheCable)
The important point is not simply:
“A Yoruba man defeated a Kano man in Kano.”
The deeper question is:
How does a politician persuade voters to support someone who does not come from their own ethnic community?
That is the real lesson.
Because presidential politics requires exactly that.
If every voter votes only for his ethnic brother, nobody can win a national presidential election in a country as diverse as Nigeria.
The successful presidential candidate must construct something bigger than ethnicity.
He must create a political identity that says:
“I may be Yoruba, but I can represent Kano.”
Or:
“I may be Hausa, but I can represent Enugu.”
Or:
“I may be Igbo, but I can represent Sokoto.”
Or:
“I may be from the South-South, but I can represent Kaduna.”
That is national political leadership.
THE ABiola MODEL: POLITICS THROUGH RELATIONSHIPS
Funtua specifically recalled Abiola as someone who cultivated people and participated in their activities. His example was that if Abiola could not personally attend an event, a representative could be sent. (TheCable)
Whether one accepts every element of Funtua’s interpretation or not, the underlying principle is powerful.
Political relationships are accumulated long before votes are needed.
A politician who remembers people only during elections is not building a political network.
He is conducting a transaction.
There is a huge difference.
A politician who attends your wedding, burial, conference, community meeting, religious celebration, cultural event or political gathering when there is no election immediately around the corner is investing in social capital.
When the election eventually arrives, that relationship already exists.
This is why serious political operators do not merely count votes.
They count:
* relationships;
* influencers;
* gatekeepers;
* institutions;
* community leaders;
* religious networks;
* traditional authorities;
* professional associations;
* youth organisations;
* women organisations;
* business communities;
* party structures;
* media relationships;
* civil society networks;
* former political opponents;
* and informal power brokers.
Politics is a network before it becomes an election.
PART THREE
“BELONGING” IS A POLITICAL CONCEPT
Funtua’s controversial phrase was that the Igbo must “belong.”
Taken literally, the phrase can sound exclusionary.
And it deserves criticism if it is interpreted as:
“A particular ethnic group must submit itself to another group before it can aspire to power.”
That would be unacceptable in a democratic federation.
But there is another possible interpretation:
Belonging means participating in the national political bargain.
It means:
* joining national political parties;
* contesting party structures;
* cultivating alliances;
* participating in national caucuses;
* negotiating with other regions;
* building trust;
* understanding the concerns of other communities;
* offering reciprocal support;
* and developing politicians who are acceptable beyond their immediate ethnic constituency.
That principle should not apply only to the Igbo.
It applies to everybody.
THE NORTH MUST BELONG.
The South must belong.
The South-East must belong.
The South-West must belong.
The South-South must belong.
The Middle Belt must belong.
The minorities must belong.
Every ethnic nationality must belong.
But belonging should never mean subordination.
It should mean participation.
That distinction is fundamental.
PART FOUR
POLITICS IS A GAME OF RECIPROCITY
One of the most important concepts in political negotiation is reciprocity.
Politics asks:
“If I support you, what political value does my support create, and what relationship are we building?”
This does not necessarily mean crude transactional politics.
It means understanding mutual interests.
For example:
A northern politician may support a southern presidential candidate because the candidate has demonstrated commitment to national security.
A South-East politician may support a northern candidate because the candidate has agreed to constitutional reforms.
A South-South bloc may support a candidate because of economic and infrastructure commitments.
A Middle Belt coalition may negotiate around security, federal appointments and development.
The resulting coalition is not necessarily based on love.
It is based on converging interests.
This is how politics works everywhere.
POLITICS IS NOT FRIENDSHIP
This is another lesson young politicians must learn.
You do not need everyone to love you.
You need enough people to trust that their interests can coexist with your ambition.
A politician who insists:
“I will only work with people who agree with me on everything”
will struggle to build a national coalition.
Politics requires the ability to say:
“We disagree on this, but we can cooperate on that.”
That is political maturity.
PART FIVE
THE FOUR LEVELS OF POLITICAL NEGOTIATION
Every serious politician should understand that political negotiation happens simultaneously at several levels.
LEVEL ONE — ETHNIC NEGOTIATION
This concerns:
* ethnic identity;
* historical grievances;
* cultural interests;
* representation;
* perceived marginalisation;
* traditional institutions;
* communal security.
This level matters because identity is powerful.
But it cannot be the only level.
LEVEL TWO — REGIONAL NEGOTIATION
The next level is the geopolitical zone.
For example:
North-West
North-East
North-Central
South-West
South-East
South-South
A politician may negotiate with regional blocs over:
* presidency;
* vice presidency;
* Senate leadership;
* speakership;
* governorships;
* federal appointments;
* development projects;
* security;
* economic policy.
Regional coalitions often determine whether a presidential candidate can become nationally viable.
LEVEL THREE — PARTY NEGOTIATION
This is where many politicians become strategically naive.
You can have enormous popularity among your ethnic group and still lose a presidential nomination.
Why?
Because party structures are power structures.
A presidential aspirant must understand:
* delegates;
* ward structures;
* local government structures;
* state executives;
* zonal leadership;
* national working committees;
* party governors;
* legislators;
* party financiers;
* influential former office holders;
* and ideological blocs.
Winning public popularity is not automatically the same thing as winning a party nomination.
LEVEL FOUR — NATIONAL NEGOTIATION
This is the highest level.
Here the question becomes:
“Can this candidate govern Nigeria?”
Not:
“Can he win in his home state?”
Not:
“Can she mobilise her ethnic group?”
But:
“Can this candidate assemble a coalition large enough to govern a federation of radically different interests?”
That is the presidential question.
PART SIX
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A FOLLOWING AND A COALITION
A politician can have millions of followers and still lack a coalition.
Why?
Because followers may share:
* ethnicity;
* religion;
* anger;
* ideology;
* personality;
* economic frustration;
* regional identity.
But a coalition requires something different:
Shared political interest.
A coalition says:
“I don’t necessarily belong to your group, but I have enough confidence in your programme, character, relationship or political bargain to support you.”
That is much harder to build.
PART SEVEN
WHY ABiola’S EXAMPLE MATTERS
Abiola’s Kano result should not be romanticised as proof that ethnicity does not matter.
Ethnicity mattered.
Religion mattered.
Regional identity mattered.
Party structures mattered.
Personal networks mattered.
Political organisation mattered.
But Abiola’s performance demonstrated something important:
Identity does not make cross-regional politics impossible.
A candidate can transcend his immediate identity if he builds sufficient political relationships and credibility.
That is the lesson.
PART EIGHT
THE EKWUEME QUESTION
Funtua also used Alex Ekwueme’s unsuccessful 1999 PDP presidential bid as evidence for his argument.
Funtua said he had worked with Ekwueme and argued that Ekwueme’s political approach had changed and that he was less willing to engage northern and broader national caucuses. (TheCable)
This part of Funtua’s argument needs caution.
It is a political recollection and interpretation, not a complete historical explanation of why Ekwueme lost.
Contemporary reporting shows that Ekwueme was a serious contender in the 1999 PDP primary, while Obasanjo ultimately won the nomination decisively. (Mail & Guardian)
Ekwueme himself later described the circumstances differently and said that after Obasanjo was cleared to contest, he chose not to create a crisis that could threaten the transition to civilian rule, and subsequently supported Obasanjo. (africanewscircle.com)
Therefore, the intellectually honest conclusion is:
Funtua’s Ekwueme story is valuable as political testimony, but it should not be treated as the only explanation of the 1999 outcome.
That distinction matters.
Political analysis must separate:
fact
from
interpretation
from
political opinion.
PART NINE
POLITICAL ENTITLEMENT IS A STRATEGIC TRAP
Here is where the lesson becomes universal.
Every region can fall into entitlement politics.
The North can.
The South can.
The South-East can.
The South-West can.
The South-South can.
The Middle Belt can.
Minority groups can.
Religious groups can.
Political parties can.
Even individual politicians can.
Entitlement says:
“We deserve it.”
Strategy asks:
“How do we secure it?”
Entitlement says:
“It is our turn.”
Strategy asks:
“Who must we persuade?”
Entitlement says:
“They should support us.”
Strategy asks:
“What interests do they have, and how can we build common ground?”
Entitlement says:
“Our numbers should be enough.”
Strategy asks:
“How do we convert numbers into a winning coalition?”
That is the difference between political emotion and political intelligence.
PART TEN
POLITICS IS THE SCIENCE OF CONVERSION
A serious politician must learn how to convert one political asset into another.
Convert population into votes.
Convert votes into delegates.
Convert delegates into nominations.
Convert nominations into coalitions.
Convert coalitions into electoral victory.
Convert electoral victory into legitimacy.
Convert legitimacy into governance.
This is the political chain.
If one link is missing, the entire strategy can collapse.
PART ELEVEN
HOW TO NEGOTIATE ACROSS ZONES
A presidential aspirant should never approach another region by saying:
“Support me because it is my turn.”
That is a weak negotiating position.
Instead:
STEP 1 — Understand the other bloc’s interests.
Ask:
What does the North-West want?
What does the North-East want?
What does the North-Central want?
What does the South-West want?
What does the South-South want?
What does the South-East want?
Not every politician will have the same answer.
But you must understand the major interests.
STEP 2 — Identify the intersection.
Suppose your bloc wants presidency.
Another bloc wants security.
Another wants economic development.
Another wants constitutional reform.
Another wants infrastructure.
Find the intersection.
Political coalitions are built around intersections of interests.
STEP 3 — Build personal relationships.
Do not wait until the primary election.
Visit.
Listen.
Attend events.
Support causes.
Maintain communication.
Build trust.
STEP 4 — Negotiate institutions, not just individuals.
A politician who relies exclusively on one godfather is strategically fragile.
Build relationships with:
* governors;
* legislators;
* traditional rulers;
* religious leaders;
* business leaders;
* youth leaders;
* professional associations;
* women leaders;
* civil society;
* party structures.
That makes the coalition resilient.
STEP 5 — Offer reciprocity.
Don’t ask:
“What can they do for me?”
Ask:
“What can we mutually accomplish?”
This changes the psychology of negotiation.
PART TWELVE
THE NEGOTIATING TABLE
Every political negotiation has at least five components.
1. The demand
What do you want?
2. The leverage
What can you bring to the table?
3. The other side’s interest
What does the other party need?
4. The zone of possible agreement
Where do both sides have overlapping interests?
5. The credibility of your promise
Why should anyone believe you?
This final point is critical.
A politician who makes ten promises and keeps none will eventually lose negotiating power.
Credibility is political capital.
PART THIRTEEN
NEVER NEGOTIATE FROM EMOTION
One of the biggest mistakes in Nigerian politics is emotional negotiation.
A politician becomes angry because another region did not support him.
Then he insults the region.
The insult is circulated.
The region becomes defensive.
The political bridge collapses.
Then the politician returns two years later asking for support.
The answer becomes:
“You insulted us.”
Politics remembers.
Therefore:
Never burn a bridge merely because you lost a negotiation.
Your opponent today may be your coalition partner tomorrow.
The person who defeated you in a primary today may become the person you need in a general election tomorrow.
Politics is a long game.
PART FOURTEEN
DON’T CONFUSE POLITICAL OPPOSITION WITH PERMANENT ENMITY
A mature politician knows how to lose without creating permanent enemies.
You can say:
“I disagree with you.”
without saying:
“You are my enemy.”
You can defeat somebody electorally and still respect them.
You can lose a primary and still support the party.
You can oppose a policy and still maintain dialogue.
That is how political institutions mature.
PART FIFTEEN
THE “BLOCK VOTE” MYTH
Another misconception is that ethnic groups vote as completely unified blocs.
They don’t.
Within every ethnic group there are:
* class differences;
* religious differences;
* ideological differences;
* generational differences;
* urban-rural differences;
* elite-populist differences;
* party loyalties;
* local political rivalries.
Therefore, politicians should never assume:
“This ethnic group belongs to me.”
No ethnic group belongs permanently to any politician.
Votes must be earned.
PART SIXTEEN
THE PRESIDENT IS NOT PRESIDENT OF HIS ETHNIC GROUP
This should be written in capital letters:
THE PRESIDENT OF NIGERIA IS NOT PRESIDENT OF THE NORTH.
THE PRESIDENT OF NIGERIA IS NOT PRESIDENT OF THE SOUTH.
THE PRESIDENT OF NIGERIA IS NOT PRESIDENT OF HIS ETHNIC GROUP.
The president is president of Nigeria.
Therefore, a presidential candidate must demonstrate the capacity to understand people beyond his immediate constituency.
That begins during the campaign.
PART SEVENTEEN
THE POLITICAL BRAND
A national candidate needs a national political brand.
The voter in Kano should be able to answer:
“What does this candidate mean for me?”
The voter in Enugu should ask the same question.
So should the voter in Lagos.
So should the voter in Jos.
So should the voter in Port Harcourt.
So should the voter in Maiduguri.
If the only answer is:
“He is our son.”
the campaign has not yet become national.
The better answer is:
“He is our son, but his programme addresses your concerns too.”
That is national politics.
PART EIGHTEEN
THE GOLDEN RULE OF COALITION POLITICS
Here is perhaps the most important principle:
Never ask another political bloc to abandon its identity. Give it a reason to participate in your coalition.
You don’t tell another ethnic group:
“Stop being Hausa.”
You tell them:
“You can remain Hausa and still be part of this Nigerian political project.”
You don’t tell another region:
“Forget your grievances.”
You tell them:
“Let us address those grievances through a political agreement.”
You don’t tell a minority:
“Your population is too small.”
You tell them:
“Your interests matter, and here is how they will be represented.”
That is coalition-building.
PART NINETEEN
THE 80/20 RULE OF POLITICAL COALITIONS
A successful political coalition often works on a simple principle:
80% common interest, 20% unresolved disagreement.
You do not need complete agreement.
If five political groups agree on:
* security;
* economic growth;
* federal character;
* infrastructure;
* constitutional stability;
they can cooperate even if they disagree about:
* taxation;
* ideology;
* regional policy;
* individual personalities.
Political maturity means learning to operate within that 80%.
Immature politics demands 100% agreement.
PART TWENTY
THE POLITICS OF CONTACT
Contact is not begging.
Contact is not surrender.
Contact is not weakness.
Contact is political infrastructure.
A politician who refuses to visit people because they belong to another region is deliberately destroying his own political infrastructure.
Every serious politician should have relationships across:
North-West
Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Jigawa.
North-East
Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa, Taraba.
North-Central
Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kogi, Nasarawa, Kwara, FCT.
South-West
Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ondo, Ekiti.
South-East
Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi, Abia, Imo.
South-South
Rivers, Delta, Edo, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Bayelsa.
The serious national politician does not merely know the governors.
He knows the political ecosystems.
PART TWENTY-ONE
WHAT DOES “NATIONAL ACCEPTABILITY” REALLY MEAN?
It does not mean everybody likes you.
That is impossible.
National acceptability means:
Enough important constituencies believe they can coexist with your presidency.
That is a much more realistic definition.
A presidential candidate should therefore ask:
Where are my strongest votes?
Where are my weakest votes?
Where can I improve?
Who are the influential leaders in those areas?
What do those communities fear?
What do they want?
What can I credibly promise?
Who can introduce me to them?
What history do I have with them?
What can I do before the election that demonstrates seriousness?
That is political planning.
PART TWENTY-TWO
POLITICAL POWER IS BUILT BEFORE ELECTION DAY
Election day is the examination.
The campaign is not the entire course.
The course begins years earlier.
Relationships.
Party membership.
Community engagement.
Policy development.
Institutional alliances.
Grassroots structures.
Media presence.
Fundraising.
Volunteer networks.
Candidate credibility.
Conflict management.
These are the political equivalents of preparation.
Then election day merely measures the strength of the structure.
PART TWENTY-THREE
WHY REGIONAL ISOLATION IS DANGEROUS
Any region that isolates itself politically creates three problems.
Problem 1 — It loses bargaining power.
If you are absent from the negotiating table, other people negotiate without you.
Problem 2 — It loses information.
You no longer understand how other blocs think.
Problem 3 — It becomes predictable.
Once political actors know that you will always vote one way, your bargaining value can decline.
The most powerful political bloc is often not the largest bloc.
It is the bloc that can move strategically.
PART TWENTY-FOUR
BUT THERE IS ANOTHER SIDE TO FUNTUA’S ARGUMENT
We must not turn this analysis into an excuse for political exclusion.
If somebody says:
“Your people must belong before they can become president,”
we must ask:
Belong to what?
A democratic federation belongs to all its citizens.
The Constitution does not establish an ethnic hierarchy.
Political inclusion cannot mean that one ethnic group must obtain permission from another to aspire to the presidency.
Therefore, the lesson must be applied equally.
If the South-East must build national alliances, then other regions must also learn to accept legitimate national aspirations from the South-East.
If minorities must build coalitions, majorities must not use coalition politics as a permanent mechanism for excluding minorities.
If politics is not “turn by turn Nigeria Limited,” then neither should politics become:
“Only those who already possess power may negotiate for power.”
That would simply replace one form of entitlement with another.
PART TWENTY-FIVE
JUSTICE AND STRATEGY MUST COEXIST
This is perhaps the most balanced conclusion.
A political movement can say:
“We deserve justice.”
But it must simultaneously ask:
“What strategy will secure that justice?”
You need both.
Justice without strategy can become frustration.
Strategy without justice can become manipulation.
Political maturity requires:
principle + strategy + coalition + negotiation.
PART TWENTY-SIX
LESSONS FOR THE SOUTH-EAST
Without reducing an entire region to one political behaviour, there are strategic lessons worth considering.
The South-East has produced major national political figures, including Nnamdi Azikiwe, Alex Ekwueme and others.
It has also produced politicians who have played important roles in national parties.
Therefore, the argument should never be:
“The Igbo don’t participate in Nigerian politics.”
That is historically too crude.
The better question is:
How can South-Eastern political participation be converted into a stronger, more durable national presidential coalition?
That is the strategic question.
The South-East does not need to abandon its identity.
It needs to translate its regional political strength into national political partnerships.
PART TWENTY-SEVEN
LESSONS FOR THE NORTH
The same intellectual honesty must apply to the North.
Northern politicians cannot assume:
“The North is the largest political bloc, therefore the presidency belongs to us.”
Population is not permanent political property.
Neither is history.
Neither is religion.
Neither is geography.
The North must also negotiate.
It must listen to the South.
It must understand minority concerns.
It must build trust.
It must accommodate competing aspirations.
National leadership requires more than numerical strength.
PART TWENTY-EIGHT
LESSONS FOR THE SOUTH-WEST
The South-West provides another powerful lesson.
Its political influence has often been strengthened by the ability of some of its political leaders to build alliances outside the region.
Whatever one’s political opinion about individual leaders, the strategic principle is clear:
regional strength becomes national power when it is connected to national networks.
That is coalition politics.
PART TWENTY-NINE
LESSONS FOR THE SOUTH-SOUTH
The South-South possesses enormous strategic assets:
* energy;
* ports;
* oil-producing communities;
* business networks;
* urban centres;
* political influence.
But resources alone do not automatically produce national political power.
Political capital must be converted into:
alliances + institutions + votes + national credibility.
PART THIRTY
LESSONS FOR THE MIDDLE BELT
The Middle Belt often occupies a strategically important position in Nigerian coalition politics.
But strategic importance must be organised.
A region cannot permanently rely on being “the deciding factor.”
It must develop:
* political institutions;
* negotiators;
* policy platforms;
* national alliances;
* strong party structures;
* leaders capable of negotiating across ethnic and religious lines.
The objective should not merely be:
“Who will support us?”
It should also be:
“What can we bring to the national bargain?”
PART THIRTY-ONE
POLITICIANS MUST LEARN THE ART OF THE POLITICAL BRIDGE
A political bridge connects people who do not naturally agree.
The bridge-builder is therefore extremely valuable.
Nigeria needs politicians who can sit with:
* Christians and Muslims;
* North and South;
* majority and minority;
* traditional and modern institutions;
* young and old;
* business and labour;
* urban and rural communities.
The politician who can translate one constituency’s fears to another constituency’s language becomes indispensable.
PART THIRTY-TWO
THE MOST DANGEROUS POLITICIAN
The most dangerous politician is not necessarily the corrupt politician.
There is another dangerous type:
the politician who knows how to mobilise anger but does not know how to negotiate peace.
He can fill a stadium.
He can dominate social media.
He can produce slogans.
He can make people angry.
But when the time comes to negotiate the actual distribution of political power, he discovers that he has no friends outside his base.
That is political weakness disguised as popularity.
PART THIRTY-THREE
THE MOST POWERFUL POLITICIAN
The most powerful politician is often the person who can make five people who distrust each other sit at the same table.
He doesn’t necessarily have the loudest voice.
He may not have the largest social-media following.
But he has something more important:
bridging capital.
He can communicate across political languages.
He can negotiate.
He can compromise without surrendering principle.
He can make enemies talk.
He can make minorities feel safe.
He can make majorities feel respected.
That is national leadership.
PART THIRTY-FOUR
POLITICAL CONTACT SHOULD BE CONTINUOUS
One of the worst mistakes is contacting another bloc only when you need its votes.
Imagine a politician who spends three years insulting another region.
Then, six months before the election:
“My brothers and sisters, I come in peace.”
People will remember.
Political relationships must therefore be cultivated during peaceful periods.
Visit before the election.
Listen before the campaign.
Build friendships before the nomination.
Support communities before asking for votes.
Create policy partnerships before asking for endorsements.
That is how trust develops.
PART THIRTY-FIVE
NEGOTIATION IS NOT BETRAYAL
This is another dangerous misconception.
Some political activists treat compromise as betrayal.
That is immature.
If two groups negotiate and both obtain part of what they want, neither has necessarily betrayed its principles.
A compromise becomes betrayal only when fundamental principles are secretly abandoned for personal gain.
But legitimate negotiation is different.
Democracy itself is institutionalised compromise.
PART THIRTY-SIX
THE POLITICS OF “WHAT DO YOU BRING?”
Before entering a major political negotiation, every bloc should prepare a political balance sheet.
What votes do we bring?
What states do we influence?
What party structures do we control?
What influential leaders support us?
What policy expertise do we possess?
What resources can we mobilise?
What social networks can we activate?
What credibility do we have?
What risks do we create for a potential partner?
What can we offer the other side?
This is how professionals negotiate.
PART THIRTY-SEVEN
NEVER OVERVALUE YOUR OWN STRENGTH
Every political movement suffers from internal propaganda.
Inside your own meeting, everybody tells you:
“We are strong.”
“Everybody supports us.”
“The country is waiting for us.”
“We will win.”
Then election day arrives.
Reality speaks.
Therefore, serious political organisations conduct brutally honest internal assessments.
They ask:
Where are we actually strong?
Where are we weak?
Which alliances are real?
Which endorsements are merely ceremonial?
How many votes can actually be delivered?
Which politicians have influence and which merely have titles?
This is where the “red-team” mentality becomes valuable.
PART THIRTY-EIGHT
THE FIVE-WHY TEST FOR POLITICAL FAILURE
Whenever a political movement loses, ask:
WHY 1:
Why did we lose?
WHY 2:
Why did voters reject our candidate?
WHY 3:
Why did our coalition fail?
WHY 4:
Why did we fail to build stronger relationships?
WHY 5:
Why did we believe our regional support would automatically translate into national victory?
The fifth answer often exposes the real problem.
PART THIRTY-NINE
THE POLITICAL MATHEMATICS
A presidential election is ultimately arithmetic.
You need enough votes to win.
Therefore, a politician must understand:
base + swing voters + coalition votes + turnout + geographic distribution = electoral viability.
Your ethnic base may give you a foundation.
But it may not give you the presidency.
That is why national candidates must pursue:
breadth, not merely depth.
A candidate who wins overwhelmingly in one region but performs disastrously elsewhere may still lose.
A candidate who is moderately strong across several regions may become more competitive.
PART FORTY
DEPTH VERSUS BREADTH
This is one of the most important concepts in presidential strategy.
DEPTH
You dominate your home region.
BREADTH
You have meaningful support across several regions.
A presidential campaign needs both.
Depth provides a base.
Breadth provides national viability.
The candidate who has depth without breadth becomes regional.
The candidate who has breadth without depth becomes vulnerable.
The strongest candidate builds:
A reliable base + credible cross-regional coalition.
PART FORTY-ONE
POLITICS AS A LONG GAME
A politician should think in:
10-year cycles, not merely election cycles.
Today’s youth leader may become tomorrow’s governor.
Today’s local chairman may become tomorrow’s senator.
Today’s journalist may become tomorrow’s political adviser.
Today’s political opponent may become tomorrow’s coalition partner.
Therefore:
Never destroy a relationship unnecessarily.
PART FORTY-TWO
THE GREAT LESSON FROM FUNTUA
Strip away the ethnic controversy.
Strip away the personalities.
Strip away the 2023 political context.
Strip away the arguments about whether his assessment of the Igbo was fair.
The fundamental lesson remains:
Political power belongs to those who can organise, negotiate, persuade and build coalitions.
Nobody should expect power to be delivered merely because they believe it is morally their turn.
But equally, nobody should use that reality to justify permanent exclusion.
The mature democratic position is:
Aspirations are legitimate.
Entitlement is dangerous.
Coalition is necessary.
Negotiation is unavoidable.
Inclusion is essential.
Electoral victory must ultimately be earned.
PART FORTY-THREE
THE NIGERIAN POLITICAL EQUATION
Nigeria’s diversity creates a simple political equation:
No major group can permanently govern Nigeria successfully by treating every other group as irrelevant.
The mathematics of Nigeria demands coalition.
The geography demands coalition.
The Constitution demands citizenship.
The electorate demands persuasion.
And political stability demands inclusion.
Therefore:
The future belongs not necessarily to the loudest ethnic group, but to the political movement capable of constructing the broadest credible coalition.
PART FORTY-FOUR
A POLITICAL 101 CHECKLIST FOR EVERY PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRANT
Before seeking the presidency, ask yourself:
1. WHO ARE MY PEOPLE?
Know your base.
2. WHO ARE NOT MY PEOPLE?
Know where you are weak.
3. WHO CAN INTRODUCE ME?
Build bridges.
4. WHAT DO OTHER REGIONS WANT?
Understand their interests.
5. WHAT CAN I OFFER?
Know your negotiating assets.
6. WHAT DO I REFUSE TO COMPROMISE?
Know your principles.
7. WHAT CAN I COMPROMISE?
Know your negotiable issues.
8. WHO ARE MY NATURAL ALLIES?
Build them.
9. WHO ARE MY UNNATURAL ALLIES?
These may be even more important.
10. WHO ARE MY POTENTIAL OPPONENTS?
Understand them.
11. CAN I WORK WITH THEM AFTER DEFEAT?
If not, reconsider your political temperament.
12. DO PEOPLE OUTSIDE MY REGION TRUST ME?
If not, start building that trust.
13. CAN MY MESSAGE TRAVEL?
If it cannot cross ethnic boundaries, it is not yet a national message.
14. CAN MY ORGANISATION DELIVER?
Popularity without organisation is fragile.
15. CAN I NEGOTIATE?
If not, presidential politics will punish you.
PART FORTY-FIVE
WHAT POLITICAL LEADERS SHOULD TEACH THEIR FOLLOWERS
We should stop teaching young Nigerians:
“Your tribe must produce the president.”
Instead, teach them:
“Your tribe must produce competent leaders capable of persuading Nigerians.”
We should stop teaching:
“It is our turn.”
Teach:
“Build the coalition that makes your turn politically possible.”
We should stop teaching:
“Everybody must support us.”
Teach:
“Give people reasons to support us.”
We should stop teaching:
“They hate us.”
Teach:
“Understand their interests and negotiate.”
We should stop teaching:
“We have the numbers.”
Teach:
“Organise the numbers.”
That is political education.
FINAL LECTURE
POLITICS IS NOT ABOUT WHO DESERVES POWER MOST.
IT IS ABOUT WHO CAN BUILD THE LEGITIMATE COALITION TO OBTAIN AND RESPONSIBLY USE POWER.
This is the deepest lesson I take from the late Isa Funtua’s controversial intervention.
I do not believe his remarks should be used as an excuse to stereotype an entire ethnic nationality.
Neither should they be dismissed merely because some people found his language offensive.
The serious political thinker must do something more difficult:
Separate the messenger from the message.
Funtua’s formulation was controversial.
But beneath the controversy lies an important political principle:
No region can successfully pursue the Nigerian presidency through regional politics alone.
And that principle applies universally.
The North cannot rely permanently on northern solidarity.
The South cannot rely permanently on southern solidarity.
The South-East cannot rely exclusively on South-Eastern solidarity.
The South-West cannot rely exclusively on South-Western solidarity.
The South-South cannot rely exclusively on South-South solidarity.
The Middle Belt cannot rely exclusively on Middle Belt solidarity.
Every presidential ambition must eventually answer the same question:
“Beyond your immediate constituency, who trusts you enough to support you?”
That is the real test.
MKO Abiola’s 1993 performance against Bashir Tofa in Kano remains a powerful historical illustration of the possibility of cross-regional electoral appeal, even though the broader historical circumstances of that election were exceptionally complex. Funtua used it precisely to make the point that presidential politics requires relationships beyond one’s home base. (TheCable)
And the response from within Igbo political circles is equally instructive. Chekwas Okorie, while disputing aspects of Funtua’s formulation, acknowledged the strategic necessity of lobbying and building support outside Igbo land rather than treating the presidency as something that should simply arrive by right. (The Guardian Nigeria)
That is where the debate should ultimately lead us.
Not:
North versus South.
Not:
Igbo versus Hausa.
Not:
Yoruba versus everybody else.
But:
What kind of political leadership can actually hold Nigeria together?
The answer cannot be ethnic entitlement.
It cannot be permanent exclusion.
It cannot be political isolation.
It cannot be grievance without strategy.
It cannot be numbers without organisation.
It cannot be ambition without negotiation.
It cannot be power without responsibility.
The answer must be:
CONTACT.
COALITION.
NEGOTIATION.
RECIPROCITY.
COMPETENCE.
CREDIBILITY.
INCLUSION.
ELECTORAL ORGANISATION.
And above everything:
THE CAPACITY TO MAKE PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT YOUR PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT YOUR SUCCESS CAN ALSO BE THEIR SUCCESS.
That is the difference between a regional politician and a national statesman.
A regional politician asks:
“How do I get my people to support me?”
A national politician asks:
“How do I make Nigerians who are different from my people believe that I can serve them too?”
The first question produces a constituency.
The second produces a coalition.
And in a country as complex as Nigeria:
A constituency can make you powerful.
But only a coalition can make you president.
— Ibrahim Bunu
