STATE POLICE IN NIGERIA: A NECESSARY REFORM WITH PERILOUS POSSIBILITIES By Khaleed Yazeed February 26, 2026

STATE POLICE IN NIGERIA: A NECESSARY REFORM WITH PERILOUS POSSIBILITIES

By Khaleed Yazeed
February 26, 2026

President Tinubu’s call for constitutional amendment to accommodate state police represents a seismic shift in Nigeria’s security architecture. After decades of centralized policing failing to protect citizens from bandits, terrorists, and kidnappers, the proposal acknowledges what security experts have long argued: that insecurity is local and requires local responses. The federal police cannot be everywhere at once, cannot understand every community’s dynamics, and cannot respond swiftly to threats that emerge in remote villages while headquarters in Abuja deliberates.

The advantages of state police are compelling. Governors would assume direct responsibility for security within their domains, eliminating the endless blame-shifting between federal and state authorities when attacks occur. Local policing would enable commanders to understand terrain, build community intelligence networks, and deploy resources based on actual threats rather than Abuja’s distant assessments. States with resources could invest adequately in security without waiting for federal allocations. Community policing could finally become reality rather than slogan. The forests that have become bandit sanctuaries could be secured through coordinated state efforts. Citizens might begin to trust police forces that actually know their names and understand their concerns.

Yet the disadvantages are equally terrifying. Nigeria’s history provides ample evidence of what happens when governors control security apparatus. During the Second Republic, some governors used state security forces to intimidate opponents, rig elections, and suppress dissent. The potential for abuse remains embedded in our political culture. A governor with a private police force could turn elections into coronations, opponents into targets, and critics into criminals. Minority groups within states could face systematic harassment. Federal authority could be undermined entirely, creating seventeen separate security jurisdictions operating without coordination. The same forests that host bandits today could become sanctuaries for state-sponsored thugs tomorrow.

The question of funding cannot be ignored. Many states currently struggle to pay salaries and pensions. Adding police forces to their financial responsibilities could cripple already weak state economies. The result might be poorly trained, poorly equipped, and poorly motivated state police officers who become predators rather than protectors. Without minimum national standards for training, equipment, and conduct, state police forces could vary so wildly in quality that citizens in some states enjoy protection while others in adjacent states face organized extortion.

The most dangerous possibility is the weaponization of state police against political opponents. Nigeria’s electoral history is already stained with violence and manipulation. Adding state-controlled security forces to the electoral equation could make a mockery of democratic competition. Incumbent governors could deploy police to disrupt opposition rallies, arrest rival candidates, and intimidate voters with impunity. The federal government might prove powerless to intervene without triggering constitutional crises. The very reform meant to protect citizens could become the instrument of their oppression.

To avoid these perils, several safeguards must accompany any constitutional amendment. State police forces must operate under strict oversight mechanisms involving civil society, traditional institutions, and independent police commissions. Minimum national standards for recruitment, training, and conduct must be established and enforced. Funding mechanisms must ensure that state police are adequately resourced without becoming vehicles for corruption. Clear jurisdictional boundaries between federal and state police must prevent conflict and confusion. Federal police must retain authority over inter-state crimes, terrorism, and offenses threatening national security. Independent complaint mechanisms must allow citizens to seek redress against police abuse without fear of reprisal.

The proposal is bold and necessary. But boldness without safeguards is recklessness. Nigeria must not rush into a reform that could replace one set of problems with another. The conversation must include all stakeholders: governors, traditional rulers, civil society, security experts, and ordinary citizens. The constitutional amendment must be precise, protective, and progressive. The implementation must be gradual, monitored, and adjusted based on experience.

President Tinubu has opened a door that has been locked for decades. What lies beyond that door could be Nigeria’s salvation or its nightmare. The difference will be determined not by the proposal itself but by the wisdom with which it is designed, the integrity with which it is implemented, and the vigilance with which it is monitored. The opportunity is historic. The responsibility is enormous. The stakes could not be higher.