By Okoi Obono-Obla
INTRODUCTION
From the above article it is clear that law is a science. That is shown from the analytical and logical examination of how Judge Lifu tackled all the points raised by both parties.
The points were these. Whether Nafiu resigned from his position, hinged on his purported letter of resignation, his denial inviting the trial judge to compare his signature on his witness oath with the one tendered by Senator Mark. How the judge resolved the question whether Senator Mark and the co-defendants were members of the ADC. How the judge resolved the issue whether a political party is required to hold a democratic election to elect its officials. And the issue whether the dispute was an internal affair of the ADC which makes it an issue the court cannot entertain.
Law is a science because the judge did not decide these points by impression or by power. He decided them by the analytical and logical digestion of the evidence presented by both sides, weighing each piece of evidence, resolving each piece for and against each side of the divide, and drawing only the conclusion which that evidence could support.
1. THE ALLEGATION THAT PUT MARK ON NOTICE
Nafiu Bala Gombe alleged, in substance, that Senator David Mark was not a member of the African Democratic Congress qualified to assume office as National Chairman.
Put in constitutional form, the allegation was threefold:
First, Mark was not a registered member of the ADC in any Ward.
Second, Mark was not a financially up-to-date member of the ADC.
Third, Mark had not been democratically elected to the office of National Chairman by members or duly elected delegates.
Each of those allegations engaged a specific provision of the ADC Constitution.
Article 8(B) provides that a prospective member shall register at the Ward where he ordinarily resides or his Ward of origin, pay the prescribed registration fee and other dues, and accept to be bound by the Constitution, rules and regulations of the Party.
Article 16 provides that a register of members shall be kept and maintained at the Ward Secretariat of the Party.
Article 18(ii) provides that every registered and financially up-to-date member who has satisfied the requirements for nomination and election is eligible to contest for a Party office.
Article 18(i) provides that the National Convention shall elect national officers.
Article 17(4) provides that where a vacancy occurs, the appropriate Executive Committee shall appoint a substitute from the zone where the former holder comes from, pending election at the next Congress or Convention.
The allegation therefore went to qualification, not merely to procedure. It raised the question whether Mark was, in law, capable of being considered for the office at all.
2. WHERE THE EVIDENTIAL BURDEN LAY
Bala alleged a fact that was peculiarly within the knowledge and custody of Mark.
Only Mark could produce:
The Ward in which he claimed membership.
The entry of his name in the register kept at that Ward Secretariat under Article 16.
The receipt or record of payment of registration fee and dues under Article 8(B).
Evidence of resignation from his former party, as required by Article 8(A)(ii), which provides that a member shall not belong to any other political party, and if he was such a member, he must have resigned such membership.
Evidence of financial up-to-date status under Article 18(ii).
Evidence of contest and election under Article 18(i) and Article 18(ii).
In civil proceedings, a party who asserts a positive fact that lies within his own custody bears the evidential burden of proving it. A court is entitled to draw an adverse inference where a party fails to produce a document that he alone could produce and that would, if produced, settle the issue.
Bala could not produce Mark’s Ward register entry, because that register, if it existed, was not in Bala’s custody. Mark could produce it, if it existed. His failure to produce it was therefore not a neutral omission. It was an evidential failure that went to the root of his defence.
3. WHAT MARK IN FACT PRODUCED
On the record as reported in the judgment delivered by Justice Peter Lifu on 5 November 2026, Mark did not discharge that burden.
He did not tender:
A Ward membership register showing his name.
A membership card identifying his Ward.
A receipt for registration fee, dues or levies.
Evidence of resignation from the Peoples Democratic Party before joining the ADC.
Evidence of financial up-to-date status.
Evidence of nomination, contest and democratic election by members or delegates.
What he tendered, on the reported judgment, was:
Exhibits ADC-6 and ADC-8, to establish notice to the Independent National Electoral Commission, monitoring by INEC, and decisions taken at the 99th National Executive Committee meeting held on 29 July 2025.
Exhibits ADC-1 and ADC-2, to establish that Bala had resigned as Deputy National Chairman.
Arguments on the general powers of the NEC under the ADC Constitution.
Arguments on the subsequent recognition of the outcome by INEC.
In short, Mark proved a meeting. He did not prove membership.
He proved that INEC was notified and was present. He did not prove that he was a registered, financially up-to-date member from an identifiable Ward.
He proved that a decision was taken. He did not prove that an election was conducted.
That is the avoidance of the kernel. The defence addressed the process of the NEC meeting, and avoided the qualification of the person who benefited from that process.
4. WHY THE AVOIDANCE IS FATAL
The avoidance is fatal for two separate reasons.
First, under the ADC Constitution, membership is a condition precedent to leadership.
Article 8 makes registration at Ward level and payment of fees and dues the gateway to membership. Article 18(ii) makes registered and financially up-to-date status the gateway to eligibility to contest. A person who has not passed through the first gateway cannot pass through the second. A person who has not passed through the second cannot be elected under Article 18(i).
Even if the NEC meeting of 29 July 2025 had been perfectly convened, and even if INEC had monitored it perfectly, NEC could not have conferred on Mark a qualification he did not possess. NEC has no power under the Constitution to waive Article 8 or Article 18(ii). Article 2 makes the Constitution supreme over any other rules, regulations or enactment of the Party. A NEC guideline or resolution cannot override the Constitution.
Second, under superior law, the process itself failed.
Section 223(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, requires the constitution and rules of a political party to provide for the periodical election on a democratic basis of its principal officers and members of its executive committee or other governing body.
Section 82(1) of the Electoral Act, 2022 requires a registered political party to give INEC at least 21 days notice of a convention, congress, conference or meeting convened for, among other things, electing members of its executive committee or other governing body.
Section 82(3) of the Electoral Act requires such elections to be conducted democratically, allowing all members or duly elected delegates to vote for the candidates of their choice.
Section 82(5) prescribes invalidity where the notice required by subsection (1) has not been given.
Justice Lifu held that the requirements of notice and of democratic election are related but distinct obligations. Evidence that INEC received 25 days notice and monitored the 99th NEC meeting may be relevant to compliance with the notice requirement. It does not, without more, establish that the officers who emerged were democratically elected.
The Court held further that the fact that INEC monitored the meeting and subsequently recognised the outcome cannot by itself validate a process that is otherwise inconsistent with a mandatory constitutional or statutory requirement.
The Court found, on the evidence before it, that there was no evidence establishing that the emergence of Mark and Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola was preceded by, or resulted from, a democratic election conducted in accordance with Section 82(3) of the Electoral Act, 2022.
The conclusion followed:
The decisions and acts founded upon that process, in so far as they depend upon the validity of their emergence as officers, cannot be sustained merely on the strength of the NEC’s general powers or INEC’s subsequent recognition.
5. THE RESIGNATION ALLEGATION AGAINST BALA
Mark attempted to defeat Bala’s standing by alleging that Bala had himself resigned.
He relied on Exhibit ADC-1, a purported resignation letter, and Exhibit ADC-2, a forwarding letter, and argued that a certified copy ought to be preferred to Bala’s denial.
Bala denied the signature on both documents and maintained that they did not bear his authentic signature.
Justice Lifu resolved the issue as follows:
First, certification does not prove authorship. The Court held that the fact that a document is certified does not, by that fact alone, settle a genuine dispute as to whether the person named in it actually signed it. Certification may establish the status of the copy as a true copy of the document in the custody of the certifying authority. It does not necessarily establish the authenticity of the disputed signature.
Second, the Court has power to compare signatures. Relying on Mobil Producing (Nig.) Ltd v. Hope (2016), and the Supreme Court decision in Adenle v. Olude (2002), the Court held that a trial court may compare a disputed signature with a signature admitted or otherwise established to be that of the person concerned, and that expert evidence is not invariably indispensable before the Court can consider the question of authenticity.
Third, the Court undertook the comparison. The Court compared the signature on Exhibit ADC-1 with the signatures appearing on the various witness statements on oath deposed to by Bala in the suit. Upon close examination and comparison, the Court found that they are materially different and cannot reasonably be regarded as one and the same signature.
Fourth, the Court applied the correct standard. The Court stated that it was mindful that an allegation of forgery is serious and that the burden and standard of proof applicable to such an allegation must be observed. The Court stated that it must not declare the signature forged merely because the plaintiff denies it, neither should it conclude that the plaintiff resigned merely because the defendants tendered the letter. The question is whether, upon considering the available specimens, the circumstances surrounding the alleged resignation, and the totality of the evidence, the alleged resignation has been established to the standard required by law.
On that test, the Court held that in the absence of a satisfactory evidential basis for treating Exhibit ADC-1 as Bala’s act, it cannot safely be relied upon as conclusive proof that he voluntarily relinquished his office.
The Court therefore rejected Exhibit ADC-1 as reliable proof of resignation and held that it did not constitute a valid or established resignation letter. The defendants could not rely on it to establish that Bala relinquished his office before the events giving rise to the suit.
The effect of that finding is that Bala remained, in law, the Deputy National Chairman who had not resigned, and therefore remained the only elected member of the National Working Committee with a subsisting tenure who could properly challenge the emergence of the Mark-led leadership.
6. THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DEFENCE
Mark also relied on the principle of party autonomy, contending in substance that the dispute concerned the internal affairs of the ADC and that the Court should not interfere.
Justice Lifu accepted the principle, and then limited it to its proper scope.
The Court held that though political parties possess autonomy to regulate their internal affairs under their constitutions, the exercise of those powers remains subject to the Constitution and applicable legislation.
The Court held that a party’s constitution cannot be interpreted or applied so as to displace the mandatory requirement of democratic elections imposed by Section 223(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 82(3) of the Electoral Act, where the relevant statutory conditions apply.
The Court held that though courts are generally cautious not to interfere in purely internal political party matters, where the complaint raises a justiciable question concerning compliance with an express constitutional or statutory obligation, the Court must determine that question by reference to the applicable law and the evidence before it.
On that basis, the Court distinguished between two different questions:
The first question is whether the NEC had power to convene, deliberate or take administrative decisions. That is an internal matter, and the Court will not lightly interfere.
The second question is whether the particular process by which Mark and Aregbesola emerged complied with the applicable legal requirements of democratic election. That is not a purely internal matter. It is a public, statutory duty, and the Court must decide it.
Mark’s defence answered the first question. It did not answer the second.
Notice to INEC and monitoring by INEC were held to be relevant to compliance with the notice requirement under Section 82(1). They were held not to be a substitute for proof of democratic election under Section 82(3). Recognition by INEC was held not to cure a failure to comply with a mandatory constitutional or statutory requirement.
7. THE RESULTING FINDING
The Court resolved the substantive questions in favour of Bala to the extent that the constitution of party leadership remains subject to the mandatory requirements of the Constitution and the Electoral Act, and that INEC’s monitoring or recognition cannot cure a demonstrated failure to comply with those requirements.
The Court ordered INEC to recognise Bala as the ADC’s only recognised NEC member, and set aside the meetings, decisions and resolutions of the Mark-led National Working Committee.
The Court also dismissed the counterclaim of Aregbesola, including the contention that Bala failed to renew his party membership and did not exhaust internal dispute-resolution mechanisms. The Court held that the assertion, without adequate proof and consideration of the legal effect of those requirements, did not establish an independent entitlement to the declaratory reliefs sought.
8. CONCLUSION ON BURDEN
The evidential position may be summarised as follows:
Bala alleged that Mark was not a registered, financially up-to-date member from an identifiable Ward, and was not democratically elected.
Mark was put on notice of that allegation and bore the evidential burden of producing the Ward register entry, the proof of payment, the proof of resignation from his former party, and the proof of election.
Mark failed to produce any of those documents.
Instead, he produced proof of a NEC meeting, proof of notice to INEC, proof of monitoring by INEC, and a disputed resignation letter against Bala.
The Court correctly held that proof of a meeting is not proof of membership, that certification is not proof of authorship, and that monitoring is not proof of election.
On appeal, Mark must therefore do what he did not do at trial. He must produce the Ward, the register, the receipt, and the election. Until he does so, Bala’s allegation on membership and qualification stands unrebutted, and the judgment cannot be displaced on that ground.
