By Otunba (Dr.) Abdulfalil Abayomi Odunowo
Politics is settled by votes, not by noise. For that reason, anyone trying to make sense of Nigeria’s road to the 2027 presidential election has to focus on what Nigerians have actually done at the ballot box.
The eight governorship elections held since President Bola Ahmed Tinubu took office offer useful evidence. Still, evidence has to be read with care. The results show that the All Progressives Congress remains Nigeria’s most formidable single political organisation. They do not, however, establish that the 2027 presidential election is already in the bag. That distinction matters.
The Numbers Cannot Simply Be Dismissed
Across Bayelsa, Imo, Kogi, Edo, Ondo, Anambra, Ekiti and Osun, APC won five of the eight governorship elections. It won Imo, Kogi, Edo, Ondo and Ekiti. The PDP won Bayelsa, APGA won Anambra, while Accord won Osun.
Perhaps even more telling than the five victories is that APC came either first or second in every one of these elections. Across the eight contests, APC candidates secured roughly 2.62 million of nearly 4.88 million total votes cast, about 53.7 per cent. From the South-East to the South-West, South-South and North-Central, the party still has structures capable of competing seriously for political power.
The opposition would therefore be making a strategic error if it mistook public dissatisfaction for the disappearance of APC’s electoral machinery. The two are not the same thing.
History offers a cautionary parallel. In the years before 2015, the then-ruling PDP controlled a large majority of states. Yet that dominance did not save it from defeat once a unified opposition coalition emerged and economic grievances deepened. State-level strength is an asset. It is not destiny.
But Eight Governorship Elections Are Not One Presidential Election
This is where triumphalism gets dangerous. A governorship election is fundamentally different from a presidential election. Governorship contests are shaped by incumbency, local personalities, ethnic considerations, traditional alliances, candidate popularity, state political structures and peculiar local conditions. Consider Anambra. Governor Charles Soludo and APGA overwhelmed APC. Yet Soludo’s political relationship with President Tinubu does not automatically mean every person who voted for Soludo will vote for Tinubu in 2027. Votes do not permanently belong to governors. They belong to citizens.
The same principle applies in Osun. Governor Ademola Adeleke’s victory on the Accord platform cannot simply be added to President Tinubu’s prospective 2027 votes because Adeleke enjoys a cordial relationship with the President. The electorate retains the right to reach a completely different decision when faced with a presidential ballot.
This distinction sits at the heart of serious electoral analysis. Dataphyte’s review of presidential outcomes between 1999 and 2023 shows that the relationship between governorship dominance and presidential success has weakened considerably since 2015. In 2023, APC controlled 21 states before the election yet won only 12 in the presidential contest. Control of state houses no longer guarantees national victory in the way it often did in the earlier years of the Fourth Republic.
APC’s Greatest Advantage May Actually Be Opposition Fragmentation
The greatest advantage President Tinubu currently has may not necessarily be overwhelming public approval. It may be the inability of his opponents to build a broad enough alternative coalition.
Nigeria’s presidential election is not decided by securing 50 per cent of the national vote. A candidate must obtain the highest number of votes while meeting the constitutional geographical-spread requirement, at least 25 per cent in two-thirds of the states and the Federal Capital Territory. That makes opposition fragmentation enormously consequential.
If several credible opposition candidates split the anti-incumbent vote while APC holds together its core electoral coalition, President Tinubu could win without securing anything close to an overwhelming majority. Nigeria saw precisely this dynamic in 2023: Tinubu won with 36.61 per cent (8.79 million votes), while Atiku Abubakar took 29.07 per cent, Peter Obi 25.40 per cent and Rabiu Kwankwaso 6.23 per cent.
The combined opposition vote far exceeded the winner’s, yet that division delivered the presidency. History reinforces the point. In 2015, opposition forces coalesced into the APC and defeated an incumbent. In most other cycles since 1999, fragmentation has favoured the party that remained the largest single bloc. Opposition parties celebrating economic difficulties while also running against one another may discover that dissatisfaction alone does not remove governments. Political organisation does.
APC Also Has Reasons To Be Cautious
The governing party should nonetheless resist the temptation to treat its five victories as proof of inevitable national dominance.
Osun offers an immediate warning. APC lost a governorship election in the South-West despite controlling the Federal Government. Anambra offers another: APGA defeated APC overwhelmingly. Bayelsa shows yet another reality: PDP remained capable of defending territory against the governing party.
So, the same eight elections being presented as evidence of APC dominance also contain evidence that APC can be beaten.
The lesson depends on which side of the statistics one chooses to stress. Serious political analysis ought to examine both.
Even more sobering is the longer historical record. No ruling party has been immune from reversal. The PDP’s long dominance ended in 2015. Voter turnout has fallen sharply from over 50 per cent in earlier cycles to roughly 27 per cent in 2023, making mobilisation, rather than mere structural advantage, decisive.
Governors Cannot Simply Transfer Their Votes
Another assumption deserves scrutiny as 2027 approaches. Nigeria’s political establishment often behaves as though governors possess millions of voters who can simply be transferred from one presidential candidate to another. That assumption is becoming harder to defend. A governor can provide political structure, funding, mobilisation, access and organisational machinery. Those things matter enormously. But a governor cannot guarantee that every citizen who voted for him will automatically follow his presidential preference.
Nigeria’s electorate is becoming increasingly sophisticated in separating elections. Someone may vote APC for governor and another party for President. Another voter may back an opposition governor while voting Tinubu for President. The phenomenon of split-ticket voting means elite endorsements should therefore be treated as political assets, not guaranteed vote transfers. Courts have repeatedly affirmed that votes belong to parties and candidates on the ballot, not to individuals who later switch allegiance.
The Economy Will Eventually Enter the Ballot Box
The most important variable may ultimately have little to do with these eight governorship elections. It will be the condition of Nigerian households. By the time Nigerians head toward the presidential election, millions of voters will ask a very simple question: “Is my life better than it was four years ago?”
That question will be answered not by government communiqués but by people’s lived experiences in markets, filling stations, electricity bills, school fees, transportation costs and household budgets. If inflation continues moderating, food prices stabilise, the naira becomes more predictable, employment expands, infrastructure improves and purchasing power begins recovering meaningfully, President Tinubu’s political position could strengthen considerably.
If Nigerians continue to face severe pressure despite improvements in macroeconomic indicators, the opposition will have a powerful campaign argument.
But having an argument is not the same thing as having an election-winning machine. The opposition would still need candidates, structures, polling agents, resources, voter mobilisation and a coalition capable of meeting Nigeria’s enormous geographical requirements. History shows that economic hardship becomes electorally decisive only when it is organised into a coherent alternative.
Three Possible Roads To 2027
The political landscape therefore suggests three broad possibilities.
First: a fragmented opposition. If the opposition enters the presidential election divided among several serious candidates while APC retains most of its governors, expands its alliances and preserves its national machinery, President Tinubu would have a substantial structural advantage. Under those conditions, APC does not need to persuade every Nigerian. It only needs to remain the largest single electoral coalition, as it did in 2023.
Second: a consolidated opposition. If major opposition forces successfully unite around one competitive presidential ticket and build functioning structures across Nigeria, the electoral arithmetic changes considerably. Votes presently divided among competing opposition parties could become concentrated. Under such circumstances, the election becomes substantially more competitive, as 2015 demonstrated when a previously fragmented opposition came together.
Third: visible economic recovery. If Nigerians begin to experience significant improvements in purchasing power and living conditions before voting begins, the President’s incumbency advantage would become much stronger. An opposition coalition would then need far more than criticism of the administration to defeat him.
My Projection
Based on the political evidence available today, APC should be regarded as the party to beat in 2027. But being the party to beat is not the same thing as having already won.
The eight governorship elections establish three propositions at once:
APC remains powerful.
APC remains geographically competitive.
APC remains beatable.
Any analysis that ignores one of those three realities risks becoming propaganda rather than political assessment. APC supporters should therefore avoid complacency. Opposition supporters should equally avoid the illusion that economic hardship automatically translates into electoral victory.
Governments are defeated when dissatisfaction is converted into organisation, organisation into coalition, coalition into turnout and turnout into properly protected votes. That remains the opposition’s greatest challenge.
For President Tinubu and the APC, the challenge is different. They must turn macroeconomic reforms into tangible improvements that ordinary Nigerians can actually feel.
Because ultimately, Nigerians will not vote on charts showing how many governorship elections APC won between 2023 and 2026. They will vote on their assessment of the future.
The Real Battle
The eight governorship elections therefore offer a warning to both camps. To the opposition, they say: Do not underestimate APC.
To APC, they say: Do not underestimate the electorate. And to Nigerians, they show something perhaps even more important: 2027 is not predetermined.
If the opposition remains divided and the economy improves materially, President Tinubu will enter the election from an exceptionally strong position. If economic hardship persists and a credible, disciplined and genuinely national opposition coalition emerges, the contest could become considerably tighter.
That is why the most consequential political battles of 2027 may actually be fought before Election Day, in the marketplace, within opposition negotiations, inside political parties and in the everyday economic experiences of Nigerian families.
APC may presently be the party to beat. But in a democracy, the final verdict belongs neither to governors nor political parties. It belongs to the Nigerian electorate.
Otunba (Dr.) Abdulfalil Abayomi Odunowo
National Chairman AATSG
Asiwaju Ahmed Tinubu Support Group.
Sunday 23rd August 2026.
