By Ibrahim BUNU
Executive Summary
Nigeria’s electoral politics is entering another important phase, and the latest decision by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to restore four previously suppressed State House of Assembly constituencies in Delta and Kogi states deserves considerably more attention than it has received.
The restored constituencies are Abraka, Isoko North II and Ughelli South II in Delta State, and Yagba West II in Kogi State. INEC said the restoration followed court judgments directing the reinstatement of the constituencies. The Commission fixed 21–25 August 2026 for party primaries in the restored constituencies. (sotwe)
The development coincides with preparations for legislative bye-elections in five other constituencies: Gombe/Kwami/Funakaye Federal Constituency in Gombe; Disina and Sakwa in Bauchi; Udu in Delta; and Dawakin Kudu in Kano. INEC has scheduled the elections for 19 September 2026. (sotwe)
The APC has consequently scheduled its own legislative primaries for 22 August 2026. (Voice of Nigeria)
On the surface, this looks like routine party administration.
It is not.
These contests provide a rare window into the changing architecture of Nigerian politics before the 2027 general election.
They will test the strength of party structures, the influence of governors and local political blocs, the ability of parties to manage primaries, the effectiveness of grassroots mobilisation, and—perhaps most importantly—the ability of political parties to convert organisational strength into actual votes.
The central strategic lesson is simple:
The 2027 election will not be won only in presidential rallies. It will be built constituency by constituency, ward by ward and polling unit by polling unit.
1. WHAT EXACTLY HAS CHANGED?
The first issue is to separate two related but different electoral developments.
A. Four constituencies have been restored
INEC has restored:
* Abraka State Constituency — Delta
* Isoko North II State Constituency — Delta
* Ughelli South II State Constituency — Delta
* Yagba West II State Constituency — Kogi
INEC’s explanation is important: this was not simply an administrative decision by a political party. The Commission said the restoration was pursuant to court judgments directing the reinstatement of the constituencies. (sotwe)
This distinction matters because political parties do not control the creation or restoration of constituencies.
They must respond to the electoral map created through the constitutional and judicial process.
B. Five separate legislative vacancies are also being contested
The second component concerns vacancies requiring bye-elections:
* Gombe/Kwami/Funakaye Federal Constituency — Gombe
* Disina State Constituency — Bauchi
* Sakwa State Constituency — Bauchi
* Udu State Constituency — Delta
* Dawakin Kudu State Constituency — Kano
That means the present electoral exercise covers nine constituencies in total.
This correction is important because some media headlines have used different numerical descriptions. The safest factual approach is to rely on the actual constituency list released in connection with the electoral timetable. (Punch Newspapers)
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2. WHY THE RESTORATION OF THE FOUR CONSTITUENCIES MATTERS
A constituency is more than an electoral boundary.
It is a political institution.
It determines:
* who can contest;
* who can vote for that seat;
* which communities receive direct legislative representation;
* which political networks compete for influence;
* which local politicians become relevant;
* and which interests acquire a formal voice inside the legislature.
Consequently, restoring a constituency changes the political equation.
For communities that had been without the particular representation associated with the suppressed constituencies, restoration creates a new opportunity to participate directly in legislative politics.
INEC itself has described the restoration process as part of its responsibility to implement court judgments and strengthen inclusive representation. (Punch Newspapers)
But politically, there is another dimension.
A restored constituency creates a new political market.
There will suddenly be:
new aspirants + new delegates/members involved in the primary process + new campaign structures + new local alliances + new expectations.
That means established politicians may have to renegotiate their influence.
A politician who previously controlled a broader geographical political structure may suddenly find himself competing with another local political bloc that has acquired a distinct constituency.
This is where the real political contest begins.
3. THE BIGGER QUESTION: WHO CONTROLS THE NEW POLITICAL SPACE?
The most important strategic question for APC and its competitors is not simply:
“Who will win the primary?”
It is:
“Who will control the political infrastructure created by the new constituency?”
That infrastructure includes:
* ward structures;
* local government networks;
* community leaders;
* youth organisations;
* women’s networks;
* polling-unit agents;
* traditional institutions;
* religious and community stakeholders;
* local opinion leaders;
* aspirants who lose the primary;
* and former office holders who may influence voters.
A candidate can win a primary and still lose the general election if the party fails to integrate the defeated aspirants.
This is one of the most important lessons Nigerian parties repeatedly learn the hard way.
4. THE APC PRIMARY IS NOT THE ELECTION
This distinction is strategically critical.
A primary election determines who carries the party’s ticket.
The general election determines whether that candidate can win the constituency.
The danger is that political parties often behave as if winning the primary means the battle is finished.
It does not.
In fact, in many constituencies, the most dangerous opponent after a primary is not the opposition party.
It is the disappointed former aspirant and his network.
Therefore, APC’s strategic objective should not merely be:
Produce a winner.
It should be:
Produce a winner without destroying the party’s ability to win the general election.
That requires reconciliation immediately after the primary.
5. THE FIRST STRATEGIC PRIORITY: FAIRNESS AND LEGITIMACY
If APC wants to use these contests as preparation for 2027, the party must treat the primaries as an organisational stress test.
The first test is legitimacy.
A controversial primary can create three problems:
Problem 1 — Litigation
A disgruntled aspirant may challenge the process.
Problem 2 — Defection
A defeated aspirant may move to another party.
Problem 3 — Vote transfer
The defeated aspirant may take a significant portion of his supporters away from APC.
Therefore, the strategic value of a primary is not simply the ability to produce a candidate.
It is the ability to produce a candidate whose nomination is credible enough for the wider party structure to defend.
6. APC SHOULD MAP EVERY CONSTITUENCY BEFORE SELECTING A CANDIDATE
A serious political organisation should never select candidates based solely on popularity among party elites.
Before the primary, APC should conduct a constituency-level political audit.
The audit should identify:
Political geography
Which wards are dominant?
Which communities have historically produced strong voting blocs?
Where is the party strong?
Where is it weak?
Candidate strength
Which aspirants have genuine grassroots structures?
Which have money but little organisation?
Which have elite connections but weak local acceptance?
Which have community credibility?
Opposition strength
Who are the strongest opposition figures?
Which parties have existing structures?
Where can opposition parties exploit APC’s internal divisions?
Risk assessment
Where is there a possibility of litigation?
Where is there a possibility of defection?
Where could ethnic, religious, communal or local-government rivalry affect voting?
This should be evidence-based rather than driven by political gossip.
7. THE MOST IMPORTANT STRATEGY: BUILD A WINNING COALITION, NOT JUST A WINNING CANDIDATE
One candidate cannot personally carry an entire constituency.
A successful legislative campaign requires a coalition.
The APC candidate should therefore build relationships with:
* defeated aspirants;
* ward leaders;
* local government leaders;
* youth groups;
* women leaders;
* community leaders;
* influential former office holders;
* professional groups;
* religious and traditional stakeholders;
* and grassroots organisers.
But this must be done carefully.
The objective should not be to purchase political loyalty.
It should be to create legitimate political inclusion and a shared electoral interest.
The party should make the defeated aspirants feel that losing the primary does not mean being expelled from the political system.
8. THE “SECOND PRIMARY” BEGINS AFTER THE PRIMARY
This is a concept Nigerian political parties frequently underestimate.
The first primary determines the candidate.
The second primary determines whether the party remains united.
The second primary is the process of reconciliation.
Within 48–72 hours of the primary, the party should know:
1. Who lost?
2. Why did they lose?
3. How many supporters do they control?
4. Are they willing to work for the party?
5. What grievances do they have?
6. Is there evidence of manipulation?
7. Can the grievances be resolved?
8. Which local leaders need to mediate?
If this is not handled immediately, resentment has time to harden.
9. THE “LOSER MANAGEMENT” STRATEGY
A mature party does not treat defeated aspirants as political enemies.
They are potential assets.
A defeated aspirant may possess:
* a strong ward structure;
* youth mobilisation capacity;
* community credibility;
* financial resources;
* campaign experience;
* relationships with local influencers.
Therefore, APC should create a structured post-primary engagement process.
The message should essentially be:
You may have lost the ticket, but you have not lost your place in the party.
That is strategically more intelligent than humiliating or marginalising the losers.
10. THE 2026 LEGISLATIVE CONTESTS ARE A LABORATORY FOR 2027
This may actually be the biggest strategic significance of the exercise.
The September 19 elections are close enough to 2027 to provide political intelligence.
They can reveal:
* turnout patterns;
* voter movement;
* effectiveness of party structures;
* performance of polling-unit agents;
* strength of opposition parties;
* impact of incumbency;
* youth participation;
* women’s mobilisation;
* effectiveness of campaign messaging;
* and the ability of parties to convert political structures into actual votes.
INEC has fixed the elections for 19 September 2026, making these contests an unusually useful pre-2027 political test. (sotwe)
The smart party will therefore treat the exercise as data collection for 2027, not merely as a collection of isolated legislative contests.
11. WHAT APC SHOULD MEASURE
After every election, APC should conduct a constituency-level post-election audit.
Not merely:
“Did we win?”
But:
Political metrics
* What was the registered voter population?
* What was turnout?
* What percentage of valid votes did APC obtain?
* Where did APC perform strongest?
* Where did APC collapse?
* Which wards underperformed?
* Which polling units produced unexpectedly strong results?
* Which polling units produced unexpectedly weak results?
Organisational metrics
* Were polling-unit agents present?
* Did they understand their responsibilities?
* Were election results properly documented?
* Were local structures functional?
* Did ward leaders mobilise effectively?
Candidate metrics
* Did the candidate have genuine grassroots acceptance?
* Did the candidate’s personal network complement the party structure?
* Did the candidate alienate important groups?
Opposition metrics
* Which opposition party performed better than expected?
* Where did the opposition concentrate its resources?
* Which local political personalities drove its performance?
That information could become extremely valuable in the 2027 campaign.
12. DO NOT CONFUSE PARTY POPULARITY WITH CANDIDATE POPULARITY
This is another strategic trap.
A popular party can lose a constituency because it nominated a weak candidate.
Conversely, a strong local candidate can sometimes outperform his party.
Therefore, APC should distinguish between:
APC vote
and
candidate vote.
The distinction matters because the party’s national popularity does not automatically translate into local electoral victory.
The same principle applies to the opposition.
13. THE OPPOSITION SHOULD NOT MAKE THE SAME MISTAKE
The strategic analysis should not be limited to APC.
The opposition parties should look at these contests as opportunities.
Their most obvious opportunity is APC’s internal competition.
If APC conducts a divisive primary, opposition parties should not waste resources attacking APC abstractly.
They should identify:
* dissatisfied aspirants;
* disgruntled ward structures;
* communities that believe they were marginalised;
* influential former party members;
* and voters who may be politically homeless after the primary.
But there is an important warning.
The opposition should not assume that every defeated APC aspirant will automatically transfer votes.
Personal loyalty, party loyalty, ethnic/community considerations and candidate credibility can all differ.
Political strategy must therefore be based on evidence, not assumptions.
14. THE RESTORED CONSTITUENCIES REQUIRE A DIFFERENT STRATEGY
The four restored constituencies deserve special treatment because they have a different political history from ordinary bye-elections.
A restored constituency has a representation narrative.
That narrative can become central to the campaign.
The political argument should therefore focus on:
representation + development + accountability + local voice.
The winning candidate needs to answer a simple question:
What will the restoration of this constituency actually mean for ordinary citizens?
If the answer is merely:
“It gives me a political seat,”
the campaign has already failed morally and politically.
The candidate must explain how representation translates into:
* legislative advocacy;
* constituency engagement;
* development priorities;
* oversight;
* access to government;
* and accountability.
15. THE APC MUST AVOID THE GODFATHER TRAP
Political endorsements are useful.
But endorsements are not votes.
A powerful politician can help a candidate obtain the ticket.
That does not necessarily mean he can deliver the electorate.
This is one of the fundamental realities of Nigerian politics.
There are three different types of political capital:
Elite capital
Connections with governors, ministers, senators, party leaders and influential politicians.
Organisational capital
Ward structures, party officials, agents and grassroots organisers.
Electoral capital
Actual voters willing to cast ballots for the candidate.
The first two are useful.
The third determines the election.
A sophisticated strategy therefore asks:
How much actual electoral capital does this candidate possess?
16. MONEY SHOULD NOT BE MISTAKEN FOR ORGANISATION
Campaign money can buy:
* visibility;
* logistics;
* communication;
* mobilisation;
* transportation;
* campaign materials.
But money cannot automatically manufacture:
* trust;
* community legitimacy;
* competent leadership;
* voter loyalty.
Therefore, APC should assess candidates according to organisation, credibility and acceptability, not simply financial capacity.
The same principle applies to every other political party.
17. THE ROLE OF YOUTH AND WOMEN
A modern legislative campaign cannot treat young people and women simply as rally participants.
They should be integrated into campaign organisation.
Young people can play important roles in:
* voter education;
* digital communication;
* polling-unit coordination;
* community outreach;
* data collection;
* election monitoring.
Women can provide critical community-level networks and mobilisation structures.
But the strategy should avoid reducing either group to decorative participation.
Their political contribution should be measurable.
18. DIGITAL CAMPAIGNING SHOULD SUPPORT, NOT REPLACE, GRASSROOTS POLITICS
One of the biggest misconceptions in contemporary Nigerian politics is that social-media visibility equals electoral strength.
It does not.
A candidate can trend on Facebook, X, TikTok or WhatsApp and still lose the polling unit.
Digital communication should therefore serve the grassroots organisation.
The correct model is:
Digital message → community engagement → voter education → polling-unit organisation → election-day execution.
Not:
Digital message → likes → assumptions of victory.
19. THE MOST DANGEROUS APC FAILURE SCENARIO
The worst-case scenario for APC is not necessarily losing a particular constituency.
It is losing because of an avoidable internal fracture.
Imagine this sequence:
Controversial primary
↓
Defeated aspirant becomes angry
↓
Supporters withdraw
↓
Opposition approaches the aggrieved bloc
↓
APC vote fragments
↓
Opposition wins
↓
The defeat becomes a national political narrative
↓
The result is interpreted as evidence of declining APC strength before 2027
That is why the management of the primary may be almost as important as the general election itself.
20. THE BEST-CASE APC SCENARIO
The opposite sequence is possible:
Transparent primary
↓
Winner emerges
↓
Defeated aspirants are immediately reconciled
↓
Party structure unifies
↓
Local grievances are addressed
↓
Candidate builds broad constituency coalition
↓
Polling-unit organisation is activated
↓
APC wins
↓
Post-election data is analysed
↓
Lessons are incorporated into 2027 strategy
That would turn the 2026 legislative contests into a genuine rehearsal for 2027.
21. A PRACTICAL 10-POINT APC STRATEGY
If I were analysing this strictly from an organisational perspective, I would recommend the following sequence:
1. Conduct a constituency political audit
Map wards, polling units, communities, political blocs, candidate networks and opposition strength.
2. Establish a credible primary process
Minimise ambiguity, communicate procedures clearly and document every stage.
3. Select electable candidates
Prioritise grassroots acceptance, competence, integrity and organisational strength.
4. Build a reconciliation committee
Begin reconciliation immediately after the primary—not weeks later.
5. Bring defeated aspirants into the campaign
Use their legitimate political networks rather than allowing them to become opposition assets.
6. Build polling-unit structures
Every polling unit should have properly trained and accountable party agents.
7. Develop constituency-specific messaging
Do not use one generic national slogan for every community.
8. Separate mobilisation from inducement
Build genuine voter engagement rather than relying excessively on transactional politics.
9. Document election-day performance
Capture results and operational problems systematically.
10. Convert the lessons into 2027 planning
Every victory and every defeat should produce institutional learning.
22. A CRITICAL WARNING ABOUT 2027
There is a temptation to interpret these legislative elections as a miniature presidential election.
That would be a mistake.
A State Assembly election is structurally different from a presidential election.
A federal constituency is different from a State Assembly constituency.
Different issues dominate.
Different candidates matter.
Different voter coalitions can emerge.
Therefore, the correct interpretation is not:
“Whoever wins these elections will win 2027.”
The correct interpretation is:
“These elections provide valuable evidence about political organisation, candidate quality, voter behaviour and party cohesion ahead of 2027.”
That distinction is fundamental.
23. THE DEEPER POLITICAL MEANING
There is a larger lesson here.
Nigeria’s political system is often discussed through the personalities of presidents, governors and party leaders.
But electoral power is ultimately distributed through thousands of smaller political units.
The presidency is the visible summit.
The constituency is part of the foundation.
If the foundation is weak, national political structures eventually become vulnerable.
Therefore, the restoration of four constituencies should be understood as part of a larger process:
electoral boundaries → political representation → party organisation → candidate selection → voter mobilisation → legislative power → broader political influence.
That is the chain.
24. THE STRATEGIC QUESTION FOR APC
The APC should therefore ask itself a much deeper question than:
“Who will win these seats?”
The real question is:
“What kind of political organisation do we want to become before 2027?”
A party that wins through internal manipulation may win a primary and lose the general election.
A party that wins through reconciliation, credible candidates, strong structures and effective voter engagement builds something more durable.
That distinction will matter enormously in 2027.
25. FINAL ASSESSMENT
INEC’s restoration of Abraka, Isoko North II, Ughelli South II and Yagba West II is more than an administrative adjustment. It restores electoral representation to constituencies that had previously been suppressed following the legal process that led to their reinstatement. (sotwe)
The simultaneous preparation for five legislative bye-elections gives Nigerian political parties an unusually concentrated electoral laboratory.
The APC’s decision to hold its primaries on 22 August 2026, within INEC’s broader 21–25 August window, shows how quickly the party is moving to establish its candidates. (Voice of Nigeria)
But speed alone is not strategy.
The real test begins after the primary.
Can APC unite its aspirants?
Can it prevent defections?
Can it select candidates who are locally acceptable?
Can it turn party structures into actual votes?
Can it learn from every polling unit?
And can it transform the lessons of September 2026 into a stronger organisational architecture for 2027?
Those are the questions that matter.
Because Nigerian elections are rarely won by slogans alone.
They are won by organisation, credibility, candidate quality, coalition-building, voter confidence, disciplined mobilisation and effective election-day execution.
And that is the deeper lesson from the current constituency reset:
2027 will not suddenly arrive in 2027.
It is being built now—one primary, one constituency, one ward and one political relationship at a time.
By Ibrahim BUNU
Analytical note: This assessment distinguishes verified electoral facts from strategic interpretation. INEC’s reported constituency list and election dates are treated as factual; recommendations and political scenarios above are analysis, not claims about what any party has secretly decided.
