By George Ogunjimi Esq.
The Law, Constitutional Accountability and the Citizen’s Right to Record.
Introduction
Recent public comments attributed to the Inspector-General of Police, IGP Tunji Disu, concerning the recording of police officers by members of the public have generated an important constitutional question: Can a Nigerian citizen lawfully use a mobile phone to photograph or video-record a police officer performing official duties in a public place?
The answer must be determined by law, not by administrative preference, institutional discomfort or the subjective perception of a police officer.
The Nigeria Police Force is an institution established and empowered by law. Its officers exercise coercive powers over citizens, including the power to stop, search, arrest, detain and, within the limits prescribed by law, use force.
Those powers necessarily attract public accountability.
A citizen who peacefully records a police officer performing a public duty is not, by that fact alone, obstructing the police. Nor does the mere presence of a camera convert an otherwise lawful police operation into a private affair.
Indeed, the recent decision of the Federal High Court in *Maxwell Nosakhare Uwaifo v. Inspector-General of Police & Ors.*, Suit No. FHC/WR/CS/87/2025, places the issue on a considerably firmer legal footing. The decision has been reported as affirming the right of Nigerians to record police officers performing public duties. ([Media Rights Agenda][2])
The question, therefore, is not whether police officers would prefer not to be recorded.
The question is whether the Constitution permits the State to prohibit peaceful recording of public police activity.
1. THE CONSTITUTION IS THE STARTING POINT
Section 39(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides for freedom of expression, including the right to receive and impart ideas and information without interference.
In contemporary society, the receipt and imparting of information are not restricted to speech and newspapers.
A citizen may communicate information through:
* writing;
* photography;
* audio;
* video;
* social media;
* livestreaming; and
* other digital means.
A video recording is therefore capable of being an exercise of freedom of expression and information.
Where the subject of that recording is a police officer performing official duties in a public place, the recording may also constitute the gathering of information concerning the administration of government, justice and the conduct of a public institution.
The constitutional protection is consequently highly relevant.
2. THE POLICE OFFICER IS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL PERFORMING A PUBLIC FUNCTION
There is a fundamental difference between recording a person in his private life and documenting a public officer while exercising governmental authority.
When a police officer stops a motorist on a public highway, conducts a search, makes an arrest or interacts with members of the public in the performance of official duties, the officer is exercising State power.
The citizen affected by that power has a legitimate interest in documenting what occurs.
This is particularly important because disputes between citizens and police officers frequently turn upon conflicting accounts:
**The citizen says one thing.**
**The police officer says another.**
A contemporaneous recording can provide objective evidence.
It may establish:
* what was said;
* who gave an instruction;
* whether the citizen complied;
* whether force was used;
* whether threats were made;
* whether an arrest was resisted;
* how a search was conducted;
* whether an officer identified himself;
* and what actually happened.
Recording therefore has an important evidential and accountability function.
3. *UWAIFO v. IGP* IS CENTRAL TO THE PRESENT DEBATE
The Federal High Court’s decision in *Maxwell Nosakhare Uwaifo v. Inspector-General of Police & Ors.*, Suit No. FHC/WR/CS/87/2025, is particularly significant.
The judgment, delivered in March 2026, addressed the interaction between police operations, citizen rights and the recording of police officers.
The case has been reported as affirming the right of Nigerians to record police officers carrying out official duties in public. ([Media Rights Agenda][2])
This development fundamentally changes the character of the present debate.
The discussion is no longer simply:
“Should Nigerians be allowed to record the police?”
The more legally precise question is:
**What lawful basis exists for preventing a citizen from exercising a right which the Constitution protects and which a competent court has expressly recognised?**
That is the question the Police Force must answer.
4. “RECORDING IS DISTRACTING” IS NOT A LEGAL PROHIBITION
The IGP’s concern that police officers should be allowed to concentrate on their duties deserves consideration from an operational perspective.
But an operational concern is not automatically a legal prohibition.
The State cannot extinguish a constitutional right merely because its exercise is inconvenient.
If the mere possibility of distraction were sufficient to prohibit constitutional rights, many ordinary activities would become unlawful.
The proper legal approach is narrower.
If a person is actually interfering with a police operation, the police may take lawful steps to deal with the interference.
But:
**recording ≠ obstruction.**
A citizen standing at a reasonable distance and silently recording a police operation has not necessarily obstructed anything.
The police must distinguish the existence of a camera from actual interference with police work.
5. THE CRITICAL DISTINCTION: RECORDING VERSUS OBSTRUCTION
This distinction should be made absolutely clear.
A person may lawfully record a police officer without:
* touching the officer;
* blocking the officer’s movement;
* preventing an arrest;
* interfering with a search;
* threatening an officer;
* assaulting an officer;
* entering an area lawfully restricted by the police; or
* otherwise interfering with the performance of police duties.
If, however, the person moves physically into the middle of an arrest and prevents the police from carrying out the arrest, that is a different situation.
The offence, if established, would arise from the **interference**, not from the mere existence of the recording.
This distinction is fundamental.
The State cannot convert an otherwise lawful activity into an offence simply by attaching the label “obstruction” to it.
The facts must establish actual obstruction.
6. THE CAMERA CAN PROTECT THE POLICE AS WELL AS THE CITIZEN
There is another dimension that deserves emphasis.
Recording police officers does not necessarily undermine policing.
It can protect police officers.
Suppose a police officer is accused of beating a suspect.
Without a recording, the court may be presented with two conflicting narratives.
The suspect says:
“The officer assaulted me.”
The officer says:
“The suspect resisted arrest and force was necessary.”
A video recording may establish the truth.
If the officer acted properly, the recording can exonerate him.
If the officer acted unlawfully, the recording can establish accountability.
The same evidence can therefore protect both sides.
This is precisely why modern law-enforcement institutions increasingly recognise the evidential value of recorded police encounters.
7. THE POLICE CANNOT CREATE A GENERAL BAN BY ADMINISTRATIVE PRONOUNCEMENT
The Inspector-General of Police is the head of the Nigeria Police Force and possesses extensive administrative authority.
But the IGP’s authority is itself derived from law.
Administrative authority cannot override the Constitution.
Nor can an administrative instruction contradict a subsisting judicial declaration.
If a court has determined that citizens possess a right to record police officers performing public duties, the Police Force must comply with that decision unless and until it is lawfully overturned or otherwise displaced by a competent court.
The proper response to disagreement with a judgment is an appeal—not an informal administrative prohibition.
This is one of the fundamental characteristics of the rule of law.
8. CAN THE POLICE SEIZE A CITIZEN’S TELEPHONE?
This is an especially important question.
A police officer who discovers that a citizen is recording him does not thereby acquire an automatic power to confiscate the citizen’s telephone.
Nor does the officer acquire an automatic power to:
* delete the recording;
* force the citizen to unlock the device;
* destroy the device;
* demand the password;
* or arrest the citizen merely because recording occurred.
If a device genuinely constitutes evidence in a criminal investigation, the police must rely upon the appropriate legal powers and procedures governing search, seizure, preservation and investigation.
The mere fact that the phone contains a recording of a police officer does not itself establish criminality.
Indeed, deleting evidence of an official encounter can raise more serious accountability concerns.
9. SECTION 37 PRIVACY DOES NOT PROVIDE A BLANKET SHIELD FOR PUBLIC POLICE OPERATIONS
It may be argued that police officers possess constitutional rights to privacy.
That proposition is correct.
But privacy is not unlimited.
A police officer conducting an official operation on a public road is not situated in the same legal circumstances as a private citizen inside his home.
There is a distinction between:
**private life**
and
**official conduct in a public place.**
The citizen’s recording of the latter is substantially connected with public accountability.
A police officer does not surrender all constitutional privacy rights merely because he wears a uniform.
But neither does the uniform confer an absolute right to prevent the public from documenting his official conduct.
The law must balance both interests.
10. THE RIGHT TO RECORD DOES NOT MEAN A RIGHT TO HARASS
The legal position should not be overstated.
The right to record police officers is not a licence to harass them.
Citizens remain subject to laws against:
* assault;
* obstruction;
* threats;
* defamation;
* harassment;
* incitement;
* destruction of property;
* and other unlawful conduct.
The proper principle is therefore:
**Record lawfully; do not interfere unlawfully.**
That principle protects both the citizen and the police officer.
11. RECORDING AND PUBLICATION ARE TWO DIFFERENT LEGAL QUESTIONS
Another important distinction is between **making a recording** and **what is subsequently done with it**.
A person may lawfully record a police encounter.
That does not necessarily mean that every subsequent publication of that recording is automatically lawful.
For example, a person who publishes a video may potentially incur liability if the publication independently constitutes defamation or violates another protected legal interest.
But such potential liability cannot be used retrospectively to declare the original act of recording criminal.
The two questions must remain separate:
Question One:
Was the recording lawful?
Question Two:
Was the subsequent publication lawful?
They require separate legal analysis.
12. THE IGP’S CONCERN ABOUT “CONTENT” SHOULD BE PROPERLY LIMITED
The IGP’s concern about citizens turning police encounters into entertainment or social-media content is understandable.
Police officers should not be subjected to unlawful harassment merely for the sake of online entertainment.
However, that legitimate concern should not be converted into a general restriction on recording.
There is a substantial difference between:
“I am recording this police operation because I want an accurate record of what happened.”
and:
“I am deliberately interfering with this police operation to create sensational online content.”
The first can be a legitimate exercise of constitutional rights.
The second may involve unlawful conduct depending on the circumstances.
The remedy for the second is enforcement of the actual law—not suppression of the first.
13. POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY IS NOT AN ATTACK ON POLICE AUTHORITY
A particularly dangerous conceptual error would be to equate accountability with disrespect.
A constitutional democracy does not ask citizens to surrender their rights in order to demonstrate respect for the police.
On the contrary, lawful police authority becomes stronger when exercised transparently.
An officer who knows that his actions may be recorded is not necessarily weakened.
He is encouraged to act professionally.
Likewise, a citizen who knows that his own conduct may be recorded has an incentive to behave responsibly.
Recording therefore has a potentially disciplining effect on **both parties**.
14. THE POLICE SHOULD CONSIDER BODY-WORN CAMERAS
There is also a practical solution to the controversy.
Rather than treating citizen recordings as an enemy, the Nigeria Police Force should accelerate the use of properly regulated body-worn cameras and other official recording mechanisms.
If police officers are recording their own encounters, and citizens are also capable of independently recording those encounters, disputes concerning what occurred can be resolved more objectively.
This would promote:
* transparency;
* evidence preservation;
* professional conduct;
* public confidence;
* protection of police officers;
* protection of suspects; and
* improved criminal investigations.
The objective should therefore be **more reliable evidence**, not less.
15. THE POSITION OF THE LAW
The legal position can consequently be stated in five propositions:
First
A citizen’s act of recording a police officer performing official duties in a public place is not, merely by itself, an offence.
Second
Section 39 of the 1999 Constitution provides important constitutional protection for the receipt and imparting of information.
Third
Actual obstruction of police duties remains unlawful. The existence of a recording device, however, is not synonymous with obstruction.
Fourth
A police officer cannot lawfully seize or destroy a citizen’s recording merely because the officer dislikes being recorded. Any search or seizure must have a proper legal foundation.
Fifth
The recent Federal High Court decision in *Uwaifo v. IGP* provides direct judicial support for the citizen’s right to record police officers performing public duties.
16. A DIRECT RESPONSE TO THE IGP
With respect to the Inspector-General of Police, the appropriate response is therefore this:
**Sir, the issue is not whether police officers enjoy being recorded. The issue is whether Nigerian citizens are entitled by law to document the exercise of public power.**
They are.
The police are not a private organisation.
They exercise authority delegated to them by the State.
Where that authority is exercised against a citizen in a public place, the citizen’s ability to document the encounter is an important component of accountability.
If the citizen obstructs the officer, deal with the obstruction.
If the citizen assaults the officer, prosecute the assault.
If the citizen threatens the officer, enforce the law against the threat.
If the citizen defames the officer, apply the law of defamation where its elements are established.
But if the citizen merely stands at a reasonable distance and records the police officer performing his public duty, **the camera should not be treated as the crime.**
That conclusion is particularly compelling in light of the Federal High Court’s decision in *Uwaifo v. IGP*.
CONCLUSION
The Nigeria Police Force deserves the support of Nigerians. Police officers operate in difficult and sometimes dangerous circumstances. Their authority must be respected.
But respect for the police cannot mean exemption from constitutional accountability.
The Nigerian Constitution establishes a government of laws, not of administrative preferences.
The police possess powers because the law gives them those powers.
For the same reason, citizens possess rights because the Constitution and other laws give them those rights.
The proper relationship between the citizen and the police is therefore not one of unconditional submission, nor one of hostility.
It is one of **lawful authority and lawful accountability**.
A citizen who peacefully records a police officer performing a public duty is not necessarily challenging police authority.
He may simply be preserving evidence.
He may be protecting himself.
He may be protecting the police officer.
He may be documenting an event of public interest.
And in a constitutional democracy, the citizen should not have to fear arrest merely because a camera is pointed at the exercise of public power.
The better principle is therefore clear:
The police should not fear the camera, and citizens should not fear the police merely because they are holding one.
The answer to irresponsible recording is responsible policing and responsible citizenship—not the suppression of constitutional accountability.
The rule of law requires that both the police and the citizen remain subject to the same law.
George Ogunjimi Esq
jurisrepubliclegal@gmail.com
12/09/2026.
Aremo Bamidele Ogunjimi
