By Akin Awofolaju, PhD, CLE, CSP, CFP, CFE ( Neuroeconomist)
Poverty Is Real, But History Is Not Relative
The open letter to President Bola Ahmed Tinubu is eloquent, personal and, in many respects, emotionally compelling but the argument is ultimately selective, historically incomplete, empirically uneven, and somewhat reductive, because it foregrounds the immediacy of today’s hardship while insufficiently interrogating the structural distortions, fiscal recklessness, monetary accommodation, policy failures, and accumulated vulnerabilities inherited by the Tinubu administration; it risks conflating the painful consequences of necessary economic correction with evidence that the reforms themselves are fundamentally misguided, while offering too little recognition of the measurable macroeconomic stabilization already underway and too little interrogation of the policies that helped create the crisis in the first place.
No responsible government should dismiss the hardship millions of Nigerians are experiencing. Food prices are high, purchasing power has been severely weakened, insecurity remains a serious concern, and millions of households are struggling.
But compassion must not become a substitute for economic analysis.
The central weakness of the letter is that it presents today’s hardship almost as though it emerged with the Tinubu administration in 2023. Where was the writer during previous administrations? The writer submission is historically incomplete.
The more important question is not simply:
“Are Nigerians suffering today?”
The answer is obviously yes.
The harder and more consequential questions are:
What economic condition did the Tinubu administration inherit in 2023?
What structural reforms have been undertaken since then?
Has Nigeria’s economic architecture improved compared with 2016 or 2023?
And are today’s sacrifices the product of reform or merely the continuation of decades of accumulated economic mismanagement?
Those questions deserve equal attention hence:
1. Poverty and hunger are not relative ; economic performance is measurable
There is a danger in treating poverty as merely a subjective or historical experience.
A poor Nigerian does not care whether today’s hardship is better or worse than the hardship of 2016. Hunger is hunger.
But that does not mean economic history is irrelevant.
A serious assessment of a government must distinguish between the condition of households today and the direction in which the economic system is moving.
These are not necessarily the same thing.
Nigeria can simultaneously have:
• severe household hardship;
• high food prices;
• elevated poverty;
• declining inflation;
• stronger external reserves;
• improved fiscal revenues;
• better foreign-exchange market functioning;
• higher oil production;
• stronger non-oil activity;
• and a healthier macroeconomic foundation.
In fact, that is precisely the contradiction Nigeria is experiencing today.
The World Bank’s April 2026 assessment is remarkably balanced: it says Nigeria has made meaningful progress in restoring macroeconomic stability, with stronger external and fiscal positions and robust growth, while household incomes have not yet recovered fully and poverty remains high.
That is a far more useful description of Nigeria than either “Tinubu has transformed Nigeria” or “Tinubu has destroyed Nigeria.”
2. We must ask what happened between 2016 and 2023
This is where the letter needs a historical counterweight.
In 2016, Nigeria was already entering a serious economic crisis. Real GDP contracted, oil production and prices were under pressure, foreign-exchange distortions were growing, revenues were weak and the economy became increasingly dependent on borrowing.
The CBN’s own historical data show that Nigeria’s public debt rose sharply in 2016, while actual capital expenditure was only N173.09 billion against a budgeted N1.587 trillion.
By 2022, the fiscal deficit had reached about N7.03 trillion, while public debt had risen to N46.25 trillion. The deficit was financed largely through domestic borrowing, including Ways and Means advances from the Central Bank.
This matters enormously.
Because one cannot condemn the economic medicine of 2023 without acknowledging the illness that preceded it.
For years, Nigeria effectively used the Central Bank as a fiscal financing mechanism. Subsidies consumed enormous resources. Exchange rate distortions created multiple markets and opportunities for arbitrage and corruption.
Government revenue remained extraordinarily low relative to the size of the economy.
The World Bank has described the PRE -2023 policy mix as distortionary and unsustainable, pointing specifically to opaque monetary and FX policies, low tax revenue and the costly gasoline subsidy.
So when the Tinubu administration removed the fuel subsidy and fundamentally changed the foreign exchange regime, Nigerians were not moving from economic prosperity into hardship.
They were moving from an already distorted economic system into the painful process of correcting it.
That distinction is crucial.
3. Was the CBN an ATM?
This question cannot be avoided.
If by “CBN as an ATM” we mean the use of monetary financing and Ways and Means advances to finance government deficits, then Nigeria’s PRE-2023 model deserves serious scrutiny.
A central bank should not become a convenient financing window for fiscal irresponsibility witnessed Emefiele’s regime which reverse is now the case under this administration on fiscal prudential balance
The IMF’s 2026 assessment specifically credits the POST-2023 reforms with ending deficit monetization, liberalizing the exchange rate and tightening monetary policy, saying these measures have reduced fiscal vulnerabilities, rebuilt external buffers and improved FX-market functioning.
That does not mean the Tinubu administration has solved Nigeria’s economic problems yet but on his way but 65% done.
It means something more important occurred here: the direction of macroeconomic policy has changed for better future for all
And structural change is often painful before it becomes beneficial.
4. But has Nigeria actually improved since 2023?
Yes, but the answer must be qualified.
Nigeria’s real GDP grew by 3.4 percent in 2024, the strongest annual growth since 2014 outside the COVID rebound years. The fiscal deficit reportedly fell from 5.4 percent of GDP in 2023 to 3.0 percent in 2024, while Federation revenues rose dramatically from about N16.8 trillion in 2023 to an estimated N31.9 trillion in 2024.
The IMF’s June 2026 assessment estimates growth at 4.0 percent in 2025 and projects 4.1 percent in 2026. It also reports that gross international reserves rose from about $40 billion at the end of 2024 to $46 billion in 2025.
The World Bank similarly reports that Nigeria’s economy grew by 4.2 percent in the first half of 2026, compared with 3.9 percent a year earlier.
These are not miracles.
But neither are they evidence of an economy going backward in every measurable dimension.
The more accurate conclusion is:
Nigeria’s macroeconomic foundation has improved, but the improvement has not yet translated sufficiently into household prosperity.
That is the real argument.
5. This is where Tinubu should be positive encouraged and challenged not merely condemned
The administration deserves considerable credit for restoring a measure of stability and institutional confidence across the country. The security landscape has shown notable improvement: Boko Haram’s insurgency has been significantly contained, persistent unrest in the Southeast has diminished, and the disruptive activities associated with IPOB appear to have receded considerably. Likewise, prolonged ASUU strikes have become far less commonplace, while widespread labour unrest once a recurring feature of Nigeria’s socioeconomic landscape appears increasingly to be a thing of the past.
Yet these achievements should not be regarded as an endpoint, but as the foundation upon which a stronger Nigeria must be built. The task now is to consolidate these gains, deepen the reforms, strengthen institutions, expand economic opportunity, and ensure that the dividends of stability reach every segment of society. This is a moment that demands not complacency, but collective commitment. Nigerians must recognize the progress, support what works, challenge what falls short, and remain steadfast in the pursuit of a safer, more prosperous, and more united nation. The Nigeria we aspire to is not beyond our reach; the work of building it has begun, and now is the time to sustain the momentum, raise the ambition, and finish the transformation.
But stabilization is not transformation.
That distinction must be made very clearly.
It is one thing to stop the bleeding.
It is another thing to make the patient healthy.
President Tinubu inherited a deeply distorted economy and has undertaken some of the most consequential reforms Nigeria has seen in decades. But Nigerians cannot eat macroeconomic stability.
They need jobs.
They need affordable food.
They need electricity.
They need functioning schools.
They need healthcare.
They need security.
They need affordable transportation.
They need real purchasing power.
They need an economy in which productivity grows faster than population and prices.
This is precisely where the administration must be held accountable.
The IMF itself acknowledges that the reforms have improved macroeconomic outcomes while warning that poverty and food insecurity remain serious. It estimated that poverty reached 63 percent at the national poverty line and that approximately 27 million Nigerians faced food insecurity in late 2025.
Therefore, the government’s next phase cannot simply be “stay the course.”
It must be:
Stay the course on stabilization, but accelerate the transition from stabilization to mass prosperity.
6. The greatest test is purchasing power
This is perhaps where the writer’s argument is strongest.
Government cannot tell a family that inflation is falling while the family still cannot afford the food it bought two years ago.
A reduction in the inflation rate does not mean prices have returned to their previous levels.
If prices rose dramatically and inflation subsequently falls, households can still be poorer in real terms.
Therefore, the administration needs to communicate this distinction honestly.
Disinflation is not deflation.
A slower increase in prices is not the same as cheaper food.
The ultimate test is whether real wages, household incomes and productivity begin growing faster than the cost of living.
That is the battlefield on which Tinubu’s economic legacy will ultimately be determined.
7. But the letter also overlooks the cost of doing nothing
There is another uncomfortable truth.
Had Nigeria continued indefinitely with petrol subsidies, multiple FX windows, monetary financing and an increasingly interventionist CBN, would Nigerians necessarily have become better off?
Probably not.
A subsidy that cannot be sustainably financed eventually becomes a debt problem.
A distorted exchange rate eventually becomes a productivity problem.
Monetary financing eventually becomes an inflation problem.
A government that continually borrows to finance consumption eventually sacrifices the future for the present.
The World Bank has described the removal of the subsidy and FX reforms as necessary steps toward rebuilding fiscal space and restoring macroeconomic stability, even while acknowledging the severe short-term pain they imposed.
Therefore, the argument should not be:
“People are suffering, therefore the reforms are wrong.”
The better argument is:
“People are suffering; therefore the government must make the reforms work for them faster.”
That is a much stronger democratic demand.
8. President Tinubu should be judged against both 2016 and 2023
This is the comparison that Nigeria needs.
If we compare only today’s supermarket prices with yesterday’s prices, the government will fail the test.
If we compare only GDP growth, the government will pass a narrow test.
Neither is sufficient.
The proper scorecard should include:
Macroeconomic stability, inflation, real wages , food affordability , employment, electricity , infrastructure , security , private investment , productivity ,poverty reduction , human capital etc
On some of these indicators, the Tinubu administration has made immeasurable progress.
On others, it has not done enough.
And on household welfare, the gap between macroeconomic improvement and lived experience remains dangerously wide.
9. The writer is right about listening but accountability must be broader
The call for the President to listen to people outside his circle is valid.
But listening must not mean listening only to critics.
The President should listen to economists, entrepreneurs, workers, farmers, manufacturers, traders, young Nigerians, state governments, local governments, opposition voices and ordinary households.
He should also listen to data.
Because data can tell uncomfortable truths to both government and opposition.
The government must accept criticism when its policies fail.
But critics must also acknowledge progress when the evidence demonstrates it.
That is the standard Nigeria deserves.
10. The real alternative: from reform to transformation
The central question is no longer whether Nigeria should reform.
It must.
The question is whether reform will be converted into inclusive economic transformation.
Nigeria now needs to move from:
stabilization → investment → productivity → jobs → rising incomes → mass prosperity.
That requires a much more aggressive agenda around electricity, agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure, housing, transportation, digital economy, education, healthcare and small-business finance.
It requires states and local governments to become productive economic engines rather than merely distribution centers for FAAC allocations.
It requires measurable KPIs for every level of government.
And it requires the federal government to demonstrate exactly where the additional revenue created by the reforms is going.
My Conclusion: HOLD THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE BUT TELL THE WHOLE STORY
The open letter is right about one fundamental principle:
A government cannot ask citizens to live indefinitely on promises of tomorrow.
But the alternative cannot be to pretend that Nigeria entered economic difficulty in May 2023.
It did not.
The country entered 2023 carrying years of accumulated fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and structural distortions.
The Tinubu administration inherited that problem and chose to confront several of its most difficult components.
That deserves recognition.
But recognition is not absolution.
Tinubu should be challenged to complete the journey.
He must turn macroeconomic stabilization into household prosperity.
He must bring inflation down further.
He must increase real purchasing power.
He must make food affordable.
He must create productive employment.
He must improve security.
He must expand electricity supply.
He must invest more effectively in human capital.
He must ensure that increased government revenues translate into visible public value.
And above all, he must demonstrate that the sacrifice Nigerians have endured since 2023 was not simply another cycle of pain without transformation.
That is the real test.
Nigeria does not need propaganda for Tinubu. Neither does not need selective amnesia against Tinubu. It needs honest economics.
The country should acknowledge where the reforms are working, expose where they are failing, and demand that the benefits reach ordinary Nigerians.
The historical question is therefore not simply:
“Are Nigerians poorer or hungrier today?”
It is:
“Has Nigeria finally begun to repair the economic machinery that produced recurring poverty, fiscal weakness, currency distortion and dependence and can this administration convert that repair into broadly shared prosperity?”
The evidence as of 2026 suggests that the machinery is being repaired, but the prosperity has not yet arrived at the scale Nigerians deserve.
That is neither a victory lap nor a condemnation.
