Sunday, 15 January 2012 07:16

There are No Good Nigerians but serial hypocritical Nigerians‏

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Nigeria Political can of worms:Issue of Identity crisis between the Hausa and Fulani's, Yoruba and Yoruba's, N'digbo, Ikweres and Igbo's, Edos and Ishans, etc

by Akin Awofolaju, Ph.D

And Just Who Are the Nigerians?

It was a question that was never too far from the surface details of the reports and commentaries from foreign pundits. Just who are these Nigerians? The presupposition behind this was that even fraudulence requires some subterfuge, some competence, some finesse besides, megalomaniac belligerence, which, by any standards in the world, was so inept, chaotic and open call for special understanding of "NIGERIANS" identity

The number of languages currently estimated and catalogued in Nigeria is 521. This number includes 510 living languages, 2 second languages without native speakers and 9 extinct languages. Over 250 ethnic groups including Hausa and Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo (Ibo) 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%, Tiv 2.5%

Religions: Muslim 50%, Christian 40%, indigenous beliefs 10%

The official language of Nigeria, English, was chosen to facilitate the cultural and linguistic unity of the country post-colonization by the British. The major native languages spoken in Nigeria represent three major families of African languages - the majority is Niger-Congo languages, such as Yoruba, Ibo, the Hausa language is Afro-Asiatic; and Kanuri, spoken in the northeast, primarily Borno State, is a member of the Nilo-Saharan family. Even though most ethnic groups prefer to communicate in their own languages, English, being the official language, is widely used for education, business transactions and for official purposes. English as a first language, however, remains an exclusive preserve of a small minority of the country's urban elite, and is not spoken at all in some rural areas.

Communication Style Due to the ethnic make-up of the country, communication styles vary. In the southwest, where the people are from the Yoruba tribe, people's communication employs proverbs, sayings and even songs to enrich the meaning of what they say. This is especially true when speaking their native language, although many of the same characteristics have been carried into their English language usage. The Yoruba often use humor to prevent boredom during long meetings or serious discussions. They believe that embedding humor in their message guarantees that what they say is not readily forgotten.

Nigerians living in the south of the country tend to speak more directly. You may also find their tone slightly louder than elsewhere. They may raise their voices even more and become emotionally excited when they feel passionately about a topic. At the same time, a harsh tone is considered unwelcoming and even hostile. Nigerians prefer facial expressions that imply empathy and believe an indifferent facial expression indicates that a person is ignorant or obnoxious.

Generally speaking, Nigerians are outgoing and friendly. Communication commences with polite inquiries into the welfare of the person and his family. Such social niceties go a long way since. Therefore, foreigners who take the time to get to know the Nigerian as a person are considered friends and welcomed into a Nigerian's inner circle of family and close friends.

Nigerian communication can also be indirect and may rely on non-verbal cues. Many use gestures when communicating. They may smile to mask their true feelings, especially when disappointed or confused. Many employ indirect eye contact to demonstrate their respect for the other person. It is common to gaze at the forehead or shoulders of someone they do not know well. Very direct eye contact may be interpreted as being intrusive unless there is a longstanding personal relationship.

At the same time, there are some Nigerians who are extremely direct communicators and have no difficulty stating what is on their minds. Therefore, it is a good idea to observe the situation carefully before determining what behavior is appropriate.

In general, Nigerians start with the general idea and slowly move into the specific, often using a somewhat circuitous route. Their logic is often contextual. They look for the rationale behind behavior and attempt to understand the context. They tend to examine behavior in its total context, not merely what they have observed

Looking into one of our leaders and his style, Bola Ige was one of a very few numbers of our politicians in the South who have been able to cut through to the core of our dilemma: the Fulani politics of power supremacy. He was no rabble-rouser who indiscriminately amalgamated more than 250 diverse ethnic grouped together as "these Nigerians" in 1918 by Lord Lugard

Bola Ige had a clear vision of a democratic Nigeria where no ethnic or racial group will dominate our polity, and his activities in the Obasanjo government have been geared towards this goal.

Fulanis hated Bola Ige for he understood the mechanism of their dominance in Nigeria. He's therefore held responsible by the Fulani power elite for what they perceive as the "anti-North" policies of the government. Of course, the President makes no policies against the North, but the interest of the Fulani Oligarchy is deceitfully called the "interest of the North" by Fulanis.

The vitriolic media campaign against him by Fulani politicians and intellectuals (and their lackeys in the Muslim North), which began as soon as he was named a minister in the Obasanjo government, has no precedence in our political history. The virulent attacks on the person of the politician were only a precursor to his physical elimination.

Unfortunately, many of his contemporaries in Yoruba politics did not understand that he was already advancing the same struggle they claim to lead. And Bola Ige himself obviously underrated the enormity of the danger he represented to the racial and power supremacist Fulani Oligarchy hence the feeble attention he paid to his personal safety and that of his family.

The professional way in which Bola Ige's elimination was carried out shows that his detractors far beyond Yoruba land were the perpetrators of his demise. The twisted mode of his murder shows that it had nothing to do with the machete and Dane gun thuggery of the Akande-Omisore rift. It should also be remembered that unknown persons had twice broken into his Abuja office and destroyed documents in the past one year.

The logic of his elimination marks out the Fulani elite as prime suspects.

Nigeria must not be misled by the hypocritical condolence visit of M. D. Yusuf, the Fulani chairman of Arewa Consultative Forum, to the Ige family in Ibadan or by the statement issued by the organization warning against the imposition of emergency rule on Osun State.

We must refuse to be deceived by the feigned kind comments of some Fulani politicians on Bola Ige, because they are presently reveling in schadenfreude, joy over misfortune that befalls one's enemy.

As bombings and shootings by the militant Islamic group Jama'atu Ahlus Sunnah Lid Da'awati Wal Jihad - better known as Boko Haram - escalate, the Nigerian government appears to be struggling to cope with the violence, or map a political solution to the crisis.

The Salafist group grabbed attention in 2009 with coordinated attacks on government buildings and police stations in four northern states which left more than 800 people dead. The attacks were revenge for an earlier clash with the police, who had opened fire on Boko Haram followers in a funeral procession in the northeastern city of Maiduguri, which was widely seen as a deliberate attempt by the state authorities to crush the group.

The violence metastasized in 2011: there were bombings of the headquarters of the police and the UN in the capital, Abuja; more than 100 died in bomb and gun attacks in a single day in two towns in northeastern Yobe State, and Boko Haram promised strikes in the largely non-Muslim Christian south. In what seemed a deliberate attempt to stir sectarian unrest, a series of bombings on churches on Christmas Day in Abuja killed close to 40 people.

What does Boko Haram represent?

Boko Haram represents different things to different people depending on where you stand in the deep divide of Nigerian society. To the political elite in the south, it may have started as a small, fringe religious sect with a radical worldview about how Nigerian society, especially the northern part, should be governed according to the dictates of Islam. But today [they feel] it is has been hijacked by the northern political elite who have not hidden their distaste about the emergence of President Goodluck Jonathan [a Christian southerner], and are now using the group to make the state ungovernable in order to ensure the return of political power to the north. To me that's simple hypocrisy for a group(North) who may or could not afford civil war that clearly non beneficial to them taking into consideration our resources control.

However, a more reflective viewpoint sees the group as representing the voices of the northern poor and downtrodden, even though misguided, who have been marginalized in the scheme of things and now seek a violent outlet to [highlight] their issues, like their counterparts in other parts of the country, such as the militants of the Niger Delta and the Odua People's Congress in the southwest, who seek consistently Oduduwa Republic given their enormous human resources.

Boko Haram (BH) represents the backward slide of Nigeria. Although presented in Islamic religious garb, its activities are deeply criminal and political. While the history of BH can be traced to a young Muslim group in the northeast of Nigeria, they have since [morphed] to include criminal groups. Today nobody is clear what the group stands for [and] people are not sure who exactly is responsible for the spate of violence in the country. There is therefore no one acceptable narrative on the issue. The perception of north/Muslim is different from that of south/Christian. Whereas must people in the south or Christians accuse what they call "a disenchanted north" for the problem, the north seems to believe the violence is being perpetrated by people in government and their foreign backers to divide the country.

Boko Haram is a name given in 2009 by the press to the religious group led by Mohammed Yusuf, when fighting broke out between the group and the Nigerian police in Maiduguri, Borno State. This group is an outgrowth of the [conservative] Izala Movement [one of the largest Islamic societies in the country]... [But] Yusuf fell out with senior preachers over ego, differences in perception of religious texts and their attitude/relationship towards the Borno State government... Yusuf built up a robust camp that was self-reliant, well organized and a popular destination of jobless and frustrated youths who found hope and engagement. As his followership grew, his confidence grew - to the deep consternation of the state governor and his courtiers... At the moment the group has resorted to taking revenge for killings, persecution and torture of its members in various prison cells nationwide, with targeted killings of informants and bombings to rattle the government. Lately they have also started to seek recognition and relevance by appealing to aggrieved northern Muslim sentiment [over Jonathan's election victory].

Where the military is involved, the rules of engagement should be defined to avoid molestation of unarmed civilians and abuses that could further mobilize local communities.

How should the government respond?

The attacks by Boko Haram and the security challenges they pose represent a potent threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria and need to be responded to with all seriousness using a multipronged strategy. Government, in my view, has not given the group all the attention and seriousness it deserves and appears to be playing politics with it in order not to be seen to be hurting certain vested interests. A more holistic strategy should combine an intelligence-led security approach to fish out the masterminds of the attacks, and initiatives that would aid the isolation of the group from the communities in which they operate.

The government needs to be decisive and deepen intelligence gathering. Where the military is involved, the rules of engagement should be defined to avoid molestation of unarmed civilians and abuses that could further mobilize local communities against the state. The government will also need to make a long-term strategic investment in the northeast of the country to contain the level of poverty and exclusion in the area.

The federal government should:

Appoint independent local, national or international leaders to appeal, appease and engage the aggrieved sect members and leaders;

Unban the group, granting them the right to freedom of belief and practice as guaranteed by the Nigerian constitution;

Renounce the use of violence, by all parties;

Unconditionally release the thousands of Yusufiyya members in cells, detained without charge;

Dispassionately review the events of 2009 and show remorse where necessary;

Work to win the confidence and trust of the affected communities through careful conflict resolution measures;

Compensate and rehabilitate all those families who have suffered loses both human and material;

Allocate federal government resources for rapid rehabilitation of infrastructure, boost agriculture and cross-border trading to promote rapid employment for the teeming uneducated, excluded youths.

What are the constraints the government faces?

The major constraints faced by the government in dealing with Boko Haram is the politicization of everything in this country, which has crippled law enforcement and security agencies from carrying out their functions in a professional manner, without fear or favor.

There is also a certain level of insincerity and deceit on the part of government in confronting the issue squarely. A typical example is the half-hearted declaration of a state of emergency made by President Jonathan in 14 local governments areas [in Yobe], which is neither here nor there in practical terms. Everybody knows that unless you declare a state-wide state of emergency, which would mean removing elected governors and replacing them with people with clear mandates to work with security agencies to restore law and order in affected states within a given period of time, not much can be achieved.

Lack of capacity, especially intelligence gathering capacity, poor political will to face the challenge of dealing with criminality, the religious coloration of the situation, and the extreme politicization of the situation by the government.

The following: Weak and heavily compromised political leadership;

The inability of the federal government to detach itself from the exploitation of sectional, sectarian, ethnic [interests];

Inability of the federal government to reverse itself having already tagged the problem a national security threat that should be wiped out;

Difficulty in breaking free from the beneficiaries of this standoff, i.e. the leaders of the security arms of government, security equipment suppliers, agents and contractors;

The reluctance of the federal authorities to bring the former Borno State governor, Ali Modu Sheriff, to account for his misrule.


1. What is meant by the deregulation of the downstream petroleum sector?

Deregulation of the downstream petroleum sector refers to the reduction, or removal of government control, rules and regulations that restrain free operational activities in the sector. This does not mean a complete elimination of the laws that govern smooth operations of activities in the downstream oil sector. Rather, it means that the role of government in this sector will be limited mainly to providing regulatory oversight.

2. What is the rationale behind the government's plan to deregulate the downstream petroleum sector?

Deregulation of the downstream oil sector will improve the efficient use of scarce economic resources by subjecting decisions in the sector to the operations of the forces of demand and supply. This will attract new sellers, buyers and investors into the market, thereby increasing competition, promoting overall higher productivity and, consequently, lowering prices over time. The ultimate effect of this chain of activities is increased gains for the people of Nigeria who would be getting the most out of their natural resources. For example, following government's deregulation in the telecommunication, there has been a reduction in call tariffs. Similar successes have also been recorded in the banking sector with the emergence of stronger banks with unprecedented spread to several other African countries. These are classic examples of the kind of positive effects deregulation could have on the oil sector.

Deregulation further reduces economic waste and lightens social burdens caused by government control. For several years, Nigeria experienced scarcity of petroleum products that crippled national economic activities, and increased the cost of doing business, several times over. The resulting scarcity inevitably leads to a flooding of the market with adulterated products, which usually leads to the damage of vehicles and machines. On many occasions, and in many parts of the country, particularly outside of the big cities and towns, a majority of Nigerians have been forced to buy petroleum products at 300% higher than their original price. Deregulation will help address this price scalping and a host of associated problems related to the sector.

Deregulation of the downstream oil sector promises to be the way forward in expanding opportunities for economic growth and a competitive downstream petroleum sector if regulation in the downstream sector is limited to oversight and supervisory functions, aimed at guaranteeing quality of products and preventing consumer exploitation, then the process of deregulation could help achieve greater cost-effectiveness.

3. How important is pricing to deregulation of the downstream oil sector?

Appropriate pricing of petroleum products is one of the major factors that will attract private investment into the Nigerian downstream petroleum sector. This is because the prices of the petroleum products will be set by independent marketers based on demands and the supply of the products. Like every other goods and services in the marketplace, independent oil marketers would be free to set their prices. This would lead to further reduction in prices for refined oil product until an appropriate market price is attained. Continued subsidization by the government will not help achieve such appropriate pricing. Deregulation through subsidy removal will lead to adjustments that will push prices towards its market-determined level. Appropriate pricing achieved through this policy will make activities in the sector more profitable and attractive to private domestic and foreign investors.

4. Is rehabilitating the refineries part of the strategy for deregulating the downstream petroleum sector?

Yes. In the last 12 months the country's refineries have worked relatively well, and this has led to increased capacity utilization from 30% to the current 60%. This means that for 12 months now, the country's refined petroleum production capacity has been steadily on the increase. To further improve on this to an internationally accepted level of 90% capacity utilization in the next 24 months, the original contractors responsible for building the refineries have been contracted to carry out a Turnaround Maintenance (TAM) of these refineries. Specifically, TAM for the Port Harcourt Refinery will be carried out in the first Quarter 2012. This would be followed by the Kaduna Refinery and then the Warri Refinery. Thereafter, the normal cycle of TAM will be respected.

However, research and analysis show that even if all the country's refineries were to operate at full capacity, there would still be a petrol supply gap of 15 million liters per day. Therefore, importation WILL remain inevitable until additional refining capacities are built through the on-going Greenfield Refinery Project. Discussions are currently under way with prospective investors who are willing to provide Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to build additional refineries in the country to ensure domestic self sufficiency and the export of refined petroleum products within the next few years.

The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) contains special fiscal incentives in place to encourage the establishment of new refineries around the country. Clearly, the establishment of new domestic refineries and the rehabilitation of existing ones are critical to ensuring a successful deregulation program. A viable local refining sector will, in the long term, bring down the pump price of petroleum products below the current import parity level.

5. Are there countries that have deregulated their downstream petroleum sector and removed subsidies?

Yes, there are examples of countries that have removed petroleum subsidies, including oil producing countries. In particular, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Ethiopia have eliminated it completely. Only recently Ghana announced that it would be removing fuel subsidies in order to sustain its fiscal consolidation.

6. Why not a staggered, phased removal of fuel subsidy, if at all?

The removal of subsidies in phases has never worked in any country and there is a strong likelihood that it will not work in Nigeria. A partial removal will lead to partial results because investors will continue to be discouraged and the distortions and inefficiencies existing in the sector, such as smuggling and rent-seeking behavior, will continue. A gradual deregulation will imply that substantial amounts of money will continue to be spent on fuel subsidy through continued borrowing. This will imply that future generations of Nigeria would have to repay part of the debt being contracted. The optimal policy response, therefore, is to remove it once-and-for-all.

7. Has deregulation succeeded in other sectors of the Nigerian economy?

Yes it has! The communication, banking, and aviation sectors are typical examples where deregulation has worked in Nigeria.

Before the deregulation of the communications sector, the Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), a government-owned company, was the sole operator for telephone lines in the telecoms sector. This period was marred by inefficiency, low telephone access, high tariffs and poor services. Once the sector was deregulated, private investors, both domestic and foreign, came in with Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) services, resulting in high competition, which significantly improved service coverage, increased telephone access, and drove down prices.

Similarly, deregulation of the banking sector resulted in the emergence of strong local banks offering a variety of services, and with a high presence in several other African countries. A few of these banks are also operating in some non-African countries including the United Kingdom, the United States, and France.

Prior to deregulation of the aviation sector, Nigerian Airways, a government-owned and managed airline, was the sole operator. This resulted in service inadequacies that included flight delays and cancellation, poor route network and high airfares. With deregulation of the industry, there have been an increased number of airlines, wide coverage and reduced airfares. Today, people can book a flight from the comfort of their rooms.

These are some typical examples of where deregulation have been successful in Nigeria and have created greater competition, reduction of prices and efficiency in services more possible. This too can be achieved if the downstream sector of petroleum industry is deregulated.

8. What is fuel subsidy?

Generally, subsidy refers to the money paid, usually by government, to keep prices below what they would otherwise be in a free market system. Such intervention by government leads to a distortion that has the potential of imposing large economic costs. More specifically, fuel subsidy is the difference between the price a consumer pays for the pump price of fuel and the actual total cost of producing or importing it. For instance, the price of petrol is currently pegged at N65 per liter but the actual cost of supply is about N138 per liter at crude oil price of $110 per barrel. Therefore, the subsidy element is about N73 per liter. This means that for every liter of petrol purchased at the official price of N65, the government contributes N73. It should be noted that only petrol and kerosene currently enjoy government subsidy, and that imported and locally produced petroleum products enjoy these subsidies.

9. Who benefits from government's fuel subsidy?

Benefitting from government's subsidy depends largely on the level of fuel consumption. The greater the consumption, the more the benefit. In Nigeria, it is the rich, and not the poor, who benefit the most from fuel subsidy. The reason for this is that rich members of society can afford several cars, which gulp quite a lot of fuel every week. As they buy fuel for their cars, they benefit from the subsidy because government pays the difference between what they would have paid and what they actually pay. In contrast, many of the poor do not own cars while middle income Nigerians can only afford small cars that consume minimal fuel. In many cases, these latter groups depend on public transportation with low fuel consumption per person. As a result, they do not benefit much from the subsidy because they consume relatively very little fuel. The government subsidy as it currently stands benefits only smugglers and neighboring countries to which these petroleum products are smuggled.

10. Is it really true that fuel subsidy removal will affect only the rich and not the poor?

No, but it will affect the rich more than the poor. Right now, the rich benefit more from the subsidy since they consume more fuel relative to the poor through ownership of several cars. They are therefore more subsidized relative to the poor. This means that they will face more adjustments with the removal of the subsidy compared to the poor who consume less petrol.

11. How much does the government spend on subsidy?

Between 2006 and August 2011, total government expenditure on petroleum subsidy amounted to N3.7 trillion. Expenditure on subsidies increased from N261 billion in 2006 to N673 billion in 2010, which represents an increase of about 160%. Additionally, there have been unprecedented payments in 2011 that so far amounted to N1.4 trillion due, in part, to two key factors: increase in subsidy per liter as a result of rising global oil price, and large arrears due NNPC for household kerosene imports.

12. Is there any provision in the budget for petroleum subsidy?

Government does not have any budget line for petroleum subsidy. However, estimates are made annually for it. In the last few years, Government has provided a notional amount in the budget for subsidy payments. The monies are disbursed from the excess crude account before distributing the remainder among the three tiers of government. Thus, the issue of disparity between the amount budgeted and the actual payments does not arise.

Furthermore, the amount spent on petroleum subsidy is highly unpredictable, as some of the underlying factors are highly volatile (i.e. international price of crude oil, exchange rate, volume consumed, etc.). Therefore, Government's estimates can deviate significantly from actual payments because of these factors.

13. Shouldn't government fix the refineries before removing subsidies?

Although NNPC is making efforts to fix the refineries over the next 24 months, continuation of subsidies will be counter-productive to government's effort to deregulate the sector. As long as the subsidies are maintained, petroleum product pricing will remain a disincentive to operators and potential investors in domestic refineries. In other words, there will be little incentive to fix the refineries as long as government can continue to pay for people to import refined product from abroad. Therefore, the removal of the subsidy should logically pave the way for the proper functioning of the refineries through increased private local and foreign investment.

The fact that subsidy would be removed would create better market incentives for the old refineries to be fixed and new ones to be built. Indeed, once the downstream oil sector is deregulated, government will have no need to invest in the refineries. That becomes the responsibility of private local and foreign investors, leading to a permanent solution to the perennial problems of poor functioning of the refineries which, in fact, has been one of the major reasons why private investors have been reluctant to invest in them, despite the fact that 18 licenses have been granted for new refineries by the Federal Government.

14. Why should Nigeria remove fuel subsidy when other OPEC countries have their petroleum products subsidized?

With Nigeria's GDP per person at $1,600 per year and total crude production of approximately 2.5 million barrels per day, Nigeria has substantially less oil revenue per person and greater social challenges compared to other OPEC countries. Nigeria therefore cannot afford fuel subsidies like those provided in other OPEC countries. Consequently, when compared to other OPEC countries, Nigeria, with its large population of about 167 million, is significantly disadvantaged in terms of its low Human Development Index, which is a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, standard of living, etc. For example, Nigeria's low level of human development indicates that our spending priorities have to differ from those of more developed OPEC nations, as a large number of unmet needs will have to be addressed through the judicious use of resources that will become available following the removal of fuel subsidies.

15. Why should Nigerians not enjoy low fuel prices since the country is a major oil producer?

Crude oil price is the same for all countries whether they are oil producing or not. It is an internationally traded product; the prices are not set by the countries that produce it. Neither do oil producing countries get a discount in the international market for producing this product. Furthermore, crude oil accounts for about 80% of the final cost of fuel. Other costs include depot charges, transportation costs, chemicals, spare parts, raw materials etc. used in turning the crude into PMS or fuel. Therefore, at the current crude oil price of $110 per barrel, the finished domestic refined fuel sold to Nigerians cannot be priced lower than the cost of the crude, plus the other associated costs enumerated above which are used to refine it. This is why it is difficult to price the finished PMS fuel at a cost lower than its crude from and the total cost of production.

16. Must the government remove subsidy to provide infrastructure?

Although there is provision in the budget for capital expenditures including infrastructure, it is clearly not enough due to the poor state of infrastructure in the country and the fact that the budget is heavily tilted in favour of recurrent expenditures. Removal of subsidy will free extra cash for meeting the much needed increase in infrastructure spending.

17. What are government's plans to cushion the effects of subsidy removal?

Unlike in the past, the Federal Government has adopted initiatives that are different from previous efforts. In meeting the core needs of the people, the Federal Government has decided to channel its own share of the budgetary savings from the elimination of fuel subsidy into a combination of specific programs that will stimulate the economy and alleviate poverty, through the provision of the following:

Critical infrastructure: The proposed infrastructure projects are Niger Delta development projects; road development projects, rail transport projects; water and agriculture development with special attention to irrigation projects; electrical power projects focusing on hydropower, and Greenfield petroleum sector projects to be located in Bayelsa, Kogi and Lagos States.

Implementation of safety net projects: The planned safety net programs include maternal and child health services, public works/youth employment program, urban mass transit scheme, and vocational training schemes.

The Federal Government is launching a Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Program (SURE Program) that encapsulates all these alleviating programs. Structures have also been developed to guarantee adequate oversight, accountability, and implementation of the various projects.

18. Why not start pilot alleviating measures to ascertain that they will work effectively before removing the subsidy?

Government has a number of competing needs for the limited financial resources at its disposal and fiscal resources are needed to implement pilot alleviating measures. Moreover, one of the pillars of the Transformation Agenda guiding current policy stance is fiscal consolidation. To pilot the alleviating measure will require additional budgeting of finances for their implementation. Budgeting additional financial resources for pilot alleviating measures will run counter to this policy goal. Therefore, government aims to use the resources freed from the subsidy removal to implement the identified alleviating measures. This government is deeply committed to implementing these cushioning measures.

19. What assurance is the government giving Nigerians that the additional revenues realized from petroleum subsidy removal will be judiciously used?

The skepticism is understandable. However, similar government policies in the past have worked as promised. An example is the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF), which undertook many road, education, and health infrastructural development projects across the country. The PTF remains one of the most successful public works program embarked upon in the country.

20. Will the removal of subsidy not cause scarcity?

No. The Federal Government, through the NNPC, has made arrangements to ensure adequate supply and prevent scarcity during the period leading to deregulation and beyond. The NNPC is currently maintaining a 50-day sufficiency for petrol. This means that even if petrol is neither imported nor refined locally for a period of 50 days, Nigeria will still have sufficient quantity to meet the country's daily needs.

21. How does petrol price in Nigeria compare with those of other countries?

Petrol price in Nigeria compares favorably with those of other African countries as well as those of other oil exporting countries. The charts below show that Nigeria has one of the cheapest petrol prices across Africa, behind only Libya and Algeria. Nigeria has the lowest petrol price among its surrounding countries. The same is true of Nigeria's petrol price relative to other oil producing countries.

22. Is petroleum the only source of government revenue? Why not explore other means of revenue generation?

No, petroleum is not the only source of government revenue but it is the major source of revenue for the entire country. Of course, government is exploring other sources for revenue generation through various policies, programs, and initiatives that promote economic diversification and boosts development in key non-oil sectors such as Infrastructure, Agriculture and Entertainment and Tourism. The diversification from oil as the main source of revenue is in line with the government's transformation agenda.

The results of this diversification are expected in the medium term. In addition, government is fast-tracking reforms of revenue collecting agencies by actively engaging with them to ensure that revenues are remitted fully and promptly to the Treasury. In the short to medium term, the non-oil sector is expected to contribute a greater share of budget revenue compared to the current contribution of about 30%. In any case, the way and manner we use our major source of revenue will determine sustainability of the economy and the extent to which we are able to meet our development aspirations.

23. Why is government not seeking savings through a sharp cut in government expenditure?

Fiscal consolidation is one of the major pillars of the Transformation Agenda. This simply means that government is trying to cut down on spending by progressively reducing recurrent expenditure in favor of capital expenditures. However, government cannot afford a sharp reduction in total expenditure as this will imply reducing the capital vote, which is already insufficient to close the infrastructure gap, complete ongoing critical capital projects and begin new ones. Thus, the savings generated from subsidy removal will provide additional outlays for critically needed infrastructure.

24. If the National Assembly rejects the proposal, has the Federal Government considered the political implications of going ahead with the removal?

Nigeria has three tiers of government and each is autonomous. The Executive Branch has the responsibility for running the economy, and will continue to consult with the members of the National Assembly. Even more important is the Executive's commitment to consulting and listening to the Nigerian people. Once the Nigerian people get all the facts right through government's extensive information sharing and enlightenment campaign, we are sure that they will support the policy because the long term benefits of this policy are clear and certain and the future of the country cannot be left adrift. 25. Is the timing right?

If not now, when? If we procrastinate, the cost will only become higher. The right time to do the right thing is now.

Let always use our heads: It is better to have your head in the clouds, and know where you are... than to breathe the clearer atmosphere below them, and think that you are in paradise. Nigeria's head are still far away from hell, despite the fact some parts of his body are roasting. Life is paradise after hell.

by Akin Awofolaju, PhD

Board Certified Fraud Examiner (Applied Economist)

New York

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Akin Awofolaju Ph.D, CLE,CSP, CFE

Visionary Leadership •Business Strategy; Governance, Risk Management & Compliance (GRC) ;Digital Forensics Analysis, Quantitative Financing & Asset Management; High level Auditing/Internal Controls; Analytics Economics • International Business Expert• Global Strategic Alliances. Budget & Business Forecasting; Hedge Fund & Private Equity Expert; High-Stake Contract Negotiations. Key Partnership Development.Organizational Restructuring. Risk Management. Public and Media Relations • Forensic Accounting & Financial Analytics • Business Development • Mergers & Acquisitions • Executive Advisory Investment Analysis • Analytical Business Skills • Project Management •Learning on the Fly Skills • Interpersonal Savvy Skills • Building Effective Teams Skills • Problem Solving & Priority Setting Skills• Managerial Courage Skills• Strategic Agility & Action-Oriented Skills •

As a corporate executive with extensive fortune 100 corporate backgrounds both in personal and corporate business. Dr Awofolaju is a governance, risk management, and compliance guru, managed many organizations in the leadership capacity. His company is one of the leading Leadership Business Development, Strategic Programs in Tri-States Area. He is an American Board Certified Financial Forensic Examiner, Educator, American Board Certified Strategy Planner and also a Strategic Thinking Expert. An Applied Economist (Regional Development Economics)  Expert in forward-thinking unimaginable vision, identifying opportunities involving both start-up and existing businesses for sustainable growth.

He has been a top-ranked financial engineering expert; Business Resources & Leadership Development for educational industries in NY/NJ Regions for a decade and also leadership development expert for the fortune 100 companies where he worked as an award-winning leadership professional with over 17 years of management experience, demonstrated analytical skills. Dr. Awofolaju is a member of over twenty professional bodies amongst which are the American Association of Financial Forensic Fraud Examiners, the Nigerian Institute of Management, American Economic Association, and International Research for Income & Wealth, etc Author, a prolific writer, and columnist on contemporary issues.

Dr Awofolaju is a motivator and mentor with a collaborative, entrepreneurial management style with expertise in translating the big picture into specific business leadership strategies. Dr Awofolaju was a leading Corporate Executive (New York/New Jersey regions) for Verizon Wireless Telecommunication Company in America, where he worked for over 10 years before he started his own company. Dr Awofolaju managed the team of senior-level managers, and for his entire career he was the top performer in the region, as well as nationally. As a management expert, he has broken many business acquisition/merger records with several awards and recognitions and also attended Advanced Program at Harvard University Business School & Cornell University graduated from S.C Johnson Postgraduate Business School in Executive Leadership Development & Strategic Thinking/Planning. 

As an Co-Executive Chairman(Advisory Board) African Trade Business Center(ATBC) and Owner/Founder AmeriStrategy Inc-UsA, aided US/Africa Business enterprises with healthier job creation and maintenance in both the U.S.A & Africa, He promotes economic infrastructure and global competitiveness of U.S small businesses owned and operated by members of the minority and diaspora communities with trade

He served as a Senior consultant for Min. of finance & Debt management office (DMO) - FMoF - Diaspora Bonds of US$300million for sustainable infrastructural development and 

 Dr Awofolaju also managed over 500 high-performance driven team that generated over 450 millions of dollars in mergers & acquisitions when he worked as Regional Account Executive for British Petroleum Company for Tri- States ( PA/NJ/NY) - 1999 -2001. His strengths are his motivational and mentoring skills. A keen listener and creative thinker, Dr Awofolaju has been a consultant for individuals and businesses since 1991. He managed European financial powerhouse as President/CEO - Bayland Investments Company in Eastern Europe (1991- 1999), he discovered the executive keen interest in his experience and insight into maximizing peak performance. 

Dr Awofolaju developed the leadership development & training program that unleashes the potential of individuals or organization value adding by opening up creativity and recharging passion requisites for consistently perform at their best. Dr Awofolaju's focus resonates with others because it sheds light on why people do not perform to their potential even when they're talented and committed. Dr Awofolaju works with various CEO's, corporate executives be it in Wall Street, business professionals to athletes – professional basketball players. Dr Awofolaju’s wide range of clients illustrates how anyone can benefit from performance coaching. Dr Akin Awofolaju has been a Business consultant for individuals and businesses since 1991, when he discovered executives' keen interest in his experience and insight into achieving peak performance.

Chairman: State & Local Government  Nigerians in Diaspora: Nigeria Constitution Review Committee  
Honoree: Top 50 Nigerians in US/Canada commemorating 50yrs of Nigeria Independence @ United Nations -New York, NY -USA
Founding Chairman : NigeriaCEO Council - New York 2010
Steering Committee Member: Nigeria In Diaspora Constitution Review Committee ( 1999 Constitution Amendment Committee)
Alumni : Cornell University - Postgraduate  School: S.C Johnson School of Business, Itacha, New York - USA  
Member: Nigeria Global Forum - USA
Member of American Economic Association (AEA) -USA
Member: Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE)- USA 
Member of International Association for Research in Income and Wealth (IARIW)
President: Acumen Investment Club of  State of New Jersey
Board Member: Aberdeen Township Planning Board-New Jersey
Board Member: Mount Hope Housing Company over $300m investments/Borough of Bronx,NY